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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STANDING IN THE WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ASSERTION OF
THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE IN APA CASES
MICHAEL RAY HARRIS*

INTRODUCTION
As a basic principle, secrecy in government is contrary to the notion of
democracy held by most Americans. As James Madison wrote in the earliest
years of our republic, “[a] popular Government without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both.”1 This sentiment has been oft rekindled by other American
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(Spring 2008). J.D., 1995, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley;
Master of Studies in Law (MSL), magna cum laude, 1992, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1991,
Pitzer College. The author wants to deeply thank his wife, Charlotte Min-Harris, for her time and
patience in reviewing so many drafts of this article.
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). Madison portrays the clear understanding of our
forefathers and mothers that the people must have the means of obtaining information related to
the operation of government in order to fully realize the success of a democracy. This was clearly
not the case under the British Crown, as evidenced by statements of our nation’s preRevolutionary War leaders. For example, Patrick Henry declared at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 that “[t]he liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the
transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.” See Bruce R. James, Public Printer of
the United States, Transforming the Government Printing Office: Revitalizing Public Access to
Government Information in the Electronic Age, Address at the University Forum at Brigham
Young University – Idaho (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/news/
speeches/PP_IdahoSpeech.pdf. Similarly, in 1765, John Adams stated that “liberty cannot be
preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right[,] . . . an indisputable,
unalienable, divine right to the most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean the characters
and conduct of their rulers.” See, e.g., Hon. John Cornyn, Enduring the Consent of the Governed:
America’s Commitment to Freedom of Information and Openness in Government, 17 LBJ J. PUB.
AFFAIRS 7, 8 (2004). For this reason, it should not be a surprise that the drafters of the
Declaration of Independence included in their preamble the simple statement that “[g]overnments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .” THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). Without a doubt, as
later evidenced by the freedoms protected for the people in the Bill of Rights, including the right
to free association, to petition the government, and the freedom of the press, the drafters of the
349
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leaders, from Abraham Lincoln2 to John F. Kennedy.3 And today there
remains extremely broad support among the public for the proposition that
open government is good government.4
Historically, the notion of secrecy has been equally repugnant in the
operation of the American judicial system. As Justice Byron White once
observed in response to a question regarding whether the Supreme Court
operated too secretively, “We’re the only branch of [g]overnment that explains
itself in writing every time it makes a decision.”5 While lawyers know that this
may not actually always be the case, undoubtedly courts judiciously guard the
free flow of information in the judicial forum. It continues to be, for instance,
that courts, in determining whether to extend common law evidentiary

Declaration had in mind a specific type of “consent,” that being, of course, informed consent.
See, e.g., Cornyn, supra at 10.
2. As one author has noted, perhaps no one has expressed this sentiment “better or more
succinctly” then when “our beloved 16th President said ‘Let the people know the facts, and the
country will be safe.’” Cornyn, supra note 1, at 10. Similarly, President Lincoln’s vision, set out
in his famous Gettysburg Address on November 19, 1863, of a “government of the people, by the
people, and for the people” again echoes the need for access by the people to the inner workings
of the government through open government. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov.
19, 1863), available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=36&page=transcript.
3. “The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people
inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths, and to secret proceedings.”
President John F. Kennedy, The President and the Press: Address Before the American
Newspaper Publishers Association (Apr. 27, 1961) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library & Museum).
4. Public opinion polls taken annually between 2006 and 2008 in connection with National
Sunshine Week demonstrate that a significant (and growing) majority of Americans believe that
open government is an important cornerstone of a democratic government. In 2006, sixty-two
percent of respondents to a Scripps Survey Research Center poll, conducted at the request of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, agreed that “public access to government records is
critical to the functioning of good government.” Press Release, Open Government Is Good
Government, Public Tells Pollsters (Mar. 12, 2006), available at http://www.sunshineweek.org/
sunshineweek/polls06. In 2007, the same poll found that Americans were “increasingly suspect
[that] the federal government has become cloaked in secrecy.” Press Release, Federal
Government Seen as Increasingly Secretive; National Opinion Poll Finds Privacy Concerns
Rising (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.sunshineweek.org/ sunshineweek/scrippspoll07.
Finally, the 2008 poll found that a full three-quarters of American adults “view the federal
government as secretive, and nearly nine in 10 say it’s important to know presidential and
congressional candidates’ positions on open government when deciding who to vote for . . . . ”
Press Release, More People See Federal Government as Secretive; Nearly All Want to Know
Where Candidates Stand on Transparency (Mar. 16, 2008), available at http://www.sun
shineweek.org/sunshineweek/secrecypoll08 (hereinafter “2008 Poll”). By way of background,
National Sunshine Week was established in 2005 and has broad, bipartisan support. Sunshine
Week 2008 Participant List (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.sunshineweek.org/sun
shineweek/participants08; About Sunshine Week (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.sun
shineweek.org/sunshineweek/about.
5. James A. Meyers, A Letter from the Publisher, TIME , October 8, 1984, at 4.
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privileges, seek to carefully balance the need of preserving a litigant’s desire to
keep evidence “private” with the longstanding rule that the public “has a right
to every man’s evidence.”6
Given our want of an open and free government, the rather expansive use
in recent years of the so-called deliberative process privilege to preclude
disclosure of numerous government documents is quite surprising, if not
downright shocking. The deliberative process privilege is intended to protect
the most sensitive of internal deliberations of high-ranking, policymaking
officials in the government.7 Distilled to its essence, the rationale of the
privilege is that the confidentiality of certain material connected with the
government decisionmaking process ensures frank and open discussion among
government officials, which in turn enhances the quality of government
decisionmaking.8 In practice, the privilege is routinely invoked by the
government to excuse itself from the obligation to disclose information in civil
litigation, in response to Freedom of Information Act requests, and to
Congress.9
It is not surprising that the rationale behind deliberative process privilege is
rooted in the need to protect sensitive military information.10 Yet since its
adoption as an evidentiary privilege by the American judiciary in 1958, its use
has exploded and today is used as a filter by federal agencies, and increasingly
state agencies, to hold back from the public information that bears directly on
government policymaking.11 In its relatively short life, the deliberative process
privilege has become one of the most predominate privileges exercised by the
government and is now routinely asserted in a wide array of litigation
challenging government decisionmaking.12
Debate over the value of the deliberative process privilege to governmental
function is nothing new, and scholars have argued both for the abolishment of
the privilege,13 as well as for its expansion.14 The purpose of this article is not
6. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710, (1974) (noting that evidentiary privileges “are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth”).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973).
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative
Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 859 (1990) (noting that two of the three earliest known applications of
the privilege—Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1942] App. Cas. 624, and United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)—involved military secrets).
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See Kirk D. Jensen, Note, The Reasonable Government Official Test: A Proposal for the
Treatment of Factual Information Under the Federal Deliberative Process Privilege, 49 DUKE
L.J. 561, 567 (1999) (noting that the privilege has “spread through the federal courts like
wildfire” and “is being applied in an ever-increasing number of cases”); infra Part I.C.
13. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10.
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to wade too deep into this larger debate, although this is somewhat
unavoidable. Instead, I seek mainly to examine the use of the privilege as it
narrowly applies to judicial review of informal government rulemaking under
the federal Administrative Procedure Act, or APA.
To understand the need for this inquiry, it is important to see the APA as
the modern embodiment of the quintessential American system of checks and
balances among the three branches of government.15 With the advent of the
administrative state in the New Deal period, Congress relinquished control
over substantial areas of legislative authority in the belief that modern social
problems required lawmaking institutions that have greater flexibility and
expertise.16 Courts, legal scholars, and the American business community,
however, were rightfully wary in the 1930s and 1940s that such additional
power in the Executive Branch could result in unchecked law making, with
little or no oversight by the other branches of government.17 In fact, early
attempts to delegate legislative authority to agencies within the Executive
Branch, particularly those related to the New Deal economic reforms, were
soundly quashed by a Supreme Court protective of the constitutional status
quo.18

14. See Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative
Process Privilege, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2005).
15. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”).
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2072 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration] (stating that the New Deal reformers
sought new institutions better capable of handling modern problems); Alexander Dill, Scope of
Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L.J. 953,
953 (1984) (“[S]ince their widespread introduction during the New Deal, federal administrative
agencies have played an increasingly important role in developing and implementing
congressional policies in various areas of national concern. Congress has routinely granted broad
discretionary authority to agencies in order to accord them the flexibility necessary in highly
technical areas of regulation such as nuclear energy and environmental health, as well as in areas
of economic regulation such as banking and corporate securities . . . .”). But Professor Sunstein
also warned that “[i]t would be a mistake to overstate the association between the New Deal and
the belief in neutral expertise [in that] [i]ndependent regulatory agencies, including the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Radio Commission,
were created well before the New Deal.” Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 441 (1987). Still, there can be little doubt that the New Deal
period opened the door for ultimate acceptance by the public and the courts of the modern
administrative state. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
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It was this steadfast view in the early 1940s—that a system of checks and
balances is an indispensable constraint on administrative power—that helped
give rise to the APA19 in 1946. The APA limits the Executive’s power in
numerous ways: establishing hearing rights, separating certain administrative
functions, devising procedural safeguards, ensuring the right of public
participation, and, most importantly for the purpose of this article, independent
judicial review of agency rulemaking.20 Indeed, it is fair to say that the
oversight of the Executive Branch’s law making function established by
Congress in the APA parallels the openness and public participation in
government desired by our forefathers and mothers.21
Thus, regardless of whether the privilege has any legitimate purpose
related to executive policymaking,22 this paper proposes that the privilege is
not proper when asserted by an agency to shield documents from a court
properly tasked with reviewing the lawfulness or reasonableness of
government rulemaking. Such use of the deliberative process privilege
undermines the APA and is inconsistent with the modern role of judicial
review. As implicitly recognized through the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
so-called “hard look” doctrine in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,23 transparency in the rulemaking process is essential to ensure that an
agency has acted in a rational and lawful manner.24 The use of the deliberative
process privilege, however, can shield an agency’s reliance on evidence
outside the scope of its statutory authority, as well as wholly biased, one-sided
decisions. This is not the intent of APA, which clearly called for the courts to
review the “whole record” to ensure that an agency decision is not arbitrary or
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.25

19. Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54 (2006).
21. It has been argued that the APA, along with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App. 2), the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 552b), make up the “four pillars of open government law,” which fortifies the constitutional
commitment to open government. Brief of American Association of Law Libraries et al. as
Amici Curiae at 8, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475) (quoting from
Hearings on the FACA and the President’s AIDS Comm’n before the Senate Comm. on Global
Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) (statement of Sen. Glenn)), reprinted in 329
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2003 TERM SUPPLEMENT (Gerhard Casper & Kathleen M. Sullivan eds.,
2004).
22. As of the date this article was written, both the public and lawmakers are expressing
serious doubt as to the use of the deliberative process privilege by the Executive Branch in a
growing number of policy decisions. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.4.
23. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
24. See infra Parts III.A.1 and III.B.3.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see infra Part III.A.3.
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Part I of this Article examines the nature of the deliberative process
privilege. Emphasis is placed on the history of the privilege, from its origin in
a now defunct opinion by the British House of Lords, to its explosive use in the
American judicial system. Part II focuses on the Administrative Procedure
Act, looking primarily at the growth of the modern administrative state since
the start of the New Deal and passage of the APA in 1946 as a means to
provide a constitutional-like check on bureaucratic authority. Part III presents
the focal point of this article, examining whether the growing tendency of the
government to assert the deliberative process privilege, as a means to limit
access to relevant information in the administrative record, has undermined
judicial review. The focus in this Part will be on review of informal
administrative rulemakings, which today make up the bulk of government
policymaking with respect to domestic social and economic issues. Finally,
Part IV of this Article acknowledges the need to protect the nature of some
government activities in order, for instance, to keep certain national security
information “secret” and only in the hands of governmental officials.
However, in lieu of the broad, unchecked use of deliberative process privilege
by the Executive Branch in APA cases, this Article proposes more surgical
methods, such as in camera review or the use of protective orders, if necessary,
to limit access to sensitive information.26
I. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
A.

Scope of the Privilege

The deliberative process privilege protects certain advice,
recommendations, and opinions that are part of the deliberative, consultative,
decision-making processes of government.27 According to the Supreme Court,
the purpose of the privilege is “to prevent injury to the quality of agency
decisions.”28 This is presumably accomplished by the privilege in two ways
because the privilege: “(1) protects the integrity of the decisionmaking process
by encouraging frank debate and discussion within an agency on predecisional
matters, and (2) avoids the possibility that the public will be unnecessarily
misled by “premature disclosure of agency opinions and recommendations that
may not be incorporated into a final decision.”29

26. Moreover, there are long-recognized privileges in American and English law designed to
protect true state and military secrets, which are not as resoundly criticized by scholars,
lawmakers, and the public. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953).
27. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973).
28. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151.
29. Kristi A. Miles, The Freedom of Information Act: Shielding Agency Deliberations from
Disclosure, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1326, 1329 (1989); see also Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath
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From a legal practice standpoint, making the initial claim of the
deliberative process privilege is no different than claiming other judicially
recognized privileges, such as the attorney-client and attorney work product
privileges.30 Thus, the initial claim of privilege may be made by counsel in
response to a request for documents, in defending the deposition of an agency
employee, or in open court.31 However, unlike other privileges, which are both
claimed and defended solely by the agency’s counsel, for the government to
prevail in the use of the deliberative process privilege, the head of the agency
department with control over the decision-making process must ultimately
make a formal assertion of the privilege to the court. This generally requires
that the agency head personally inspect and consider the material before
invoking the privilege.32 Once the agency head reviews the material, the
privilege is generally asserted through an affidavit by the official describing
the material and setting forth why the legal requirements for protection as
deliberative material are met.33 This requirement of personal involvement by

Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (“The deliberative process privilege rests
on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each
remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance ‘the
quality of agency decisions’ by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make
them within the Government.” (citations omitted)). As one court has put it, the deliberative
process privilege allows “agencies freely to explore possibilities, engage in internal debates, or
play devil’s advocate without fear of public scrutiny.” Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992).
30. See, e.g., Procedures for Asserting and Defending the Deliberative Process Privilege, in
THE U.S. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
litigation/manual/3-2-a_deliberative_process.html.
31. Id. The privilege is not limited to deliberations memorialized in writing. In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 427, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). “Thus, the privilege would also
bar inquiry by [a plaintiff] by means of any discovery tool, whether by interrogatory or deposition
or otherwise, into the evaluations, expressions of opinions and recommendations on policy
matters or matters essential to” agency deliberations. DCP Farms v. Espy, Civ. No. 294CV85BA,
1995 WL 1945518, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 10, 1995).
32. DCP Farms, 1995 WL 1945518, at *2. Recently, some courts have taken the position
that the privilege permits delegation from the agency head to high-ranking subordinates. See
Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
33. Jensen, supra note 12, at 570–71. In reviewing assertions of the privilege by an agency,
courts have required a “‘detailed analysis’ of the requested documents.” Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984). In meeting its burden, the agency must do more
than make conclusory statements that the privilege is applicable. Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Dep’t of the
Air Force, 44 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 1999) (rejecting an agency’s claim of the privilege
where it parroted the case law and holding that the agency must demonstrate that disclosure
“would actually inhibit candor in the decision-making process” (citations omitted)). Much of the
case law on the issue of adequately asserting the privilege comes in the area of FOIA litigation.
See generally infra note 82. In FOIA cases, a specific type of affidavit, known as a Vaughn
Index, is required and must “itemize each document and explain the connection between the
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the agency head seeks to promote “‘consistency and prudence,’ since the
agency head will supposedly ensure that the privilege is invoked in the best
interest of the public and not merely in the agency’s litigation interests.”34
Courts have adopted a two-prong test when examining an agency’s
assertion of the deliberative process privilege to withhold information: to be
privileged the information must be both predecisional and deliberative.35 To
establish that a document is predecisional, the government must prove that the
document is “(1) ‘antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy,’ and (2) ‘a
direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or
expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.’”36 Thus, while this requirement
in large part requires that the materials “predate” the decision, “chronology
alone is insufficient.”37 Even if the materials were created before any agency
decision, to satisfy the predecisional prong of the privilege, the agency head
must demonstrate that the materials actually assisted in the decision-making
process and did not simply support a decision already made.38 Moreover, a
mere claim by an agency that the material was part of some unarticulated
decision-making process is simply not enough to justify withholding under the
deliberative process privilege. Instead, a court must be able to pinpoint an
agency decision or policy to which the document contributed.39
To establish that information is deliberative, a court must examine the
agency’s administrative process and the role of the information in that

information withheld and the exemption claimed. . . .” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 79
F.3d 1172, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1996). An adequate index must provide much more than the basic
elements of who, what and when. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding a Vaughn Index “patently inadequate” where it merely
“identifies who wrote the memorandum, to whom it was addressed, its date, and a brief
description of the memorandum”). Instead the agency must show “by specific and detailed
proof” that the privilege applies. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d
242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
34. Jensen, supra note 12, at 570–71.
35. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
36. Evans v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 276 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2003)
(citations omitted); see also ITT World Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1239 (D.C. Cir.
1983), rev’d on other grounds, 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
37. Jensen, supra note 12, at 572.
38. Id.; see also Petrol. Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
39. See Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987). While
not all courts require that material relate to a specific, final agency decision, at minimum the
agency must identify a specific decision-making process. Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926
F.2d 1192, 1195–96 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also, Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
108 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a document is not “predecisional” if it is merely
part of a “continuing process of agency self-examination”).
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process.40 If material in the document “could not reasonably be said to reveal
an agency’s or official’s mode of formulating or exercising policy-implicating
judgment, the deliberative process privilege is inapplicable.”41 While many
different judicial tests have been formulated to determine if information is
“deliberative,” in essence, what the courts want to see is that the material is
part of the “give-and-take process by which decisions are made and policy
formulated.”42 This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.43
However, courts have made it clear that certain material, even if used as
part of a decision-making process, will simply not be considered “deliberative”
in any case. For instance, the privilege has been held not to protect
information that is “merely peripheral to actual policy formation,”44
“summaries or commentaries on past agency determinations or
investigations,”45 or matters generated by private organizations.46 Finally, in
determining whether material is deliberative, courts have generally made an
“opinion/fact distinction,” where “factual information generally must be
disclosed.”47 In particular, information that is not associated with a
“significant policy decision,” but instead is “essentially technical and

40. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975) (“Crucial to the decision
of this case is an understanding of the function of the documents in issue in the context of the
administrative process which generated them.”); see also, Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft
Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 172–79 (1975); Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 237–43
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866–67 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
41. Petrol. Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1435.
42. See Jensen, supra note 12, at 573–74.
43. See Klein v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. Civ.A. 00–3401, 2003 WL 1873909, at *4
(E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2003).
44. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994).
45. See J.R. Norton Co. v. Arizmendi, 108 F.R.D. 647, 649 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
46. See Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Wu v. Nat’l
Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972). However, some courts have
adopted a “functional” equivalent test under which some documents prepared outside government
may nevertheless qualify as “intra-agency” memoranda. See, e.g., Hoover v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1137–38 (5th Cir. 1980); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83
(2d Cir. 1979); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1971). These cases
recognize that the communications between a government agency and its hired outside consultant
are protected by the privilege. See, e.g., Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1138. However, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that such a consultant must be providing its objective opinion, and may not be
communicating with the agency with its own self-interests in mind. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2001).
47. See Petrol. Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1992). A good discussion of the treatment of factual information under the deliberative process
privilege, and particularly how the line between fact and opinion is often blurred, is provided in
Miles, supra note 29, at 1330–31.
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facilitative,” is characterized by the courts as factual information that should be
disclosed.48
While the process of asserting the privilege established by the courts is, at
least facially, rigorous, in practice the deliberative process privilege has proven
to protect a large array of government documents and information. According
to the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Office of Solicitor, the privilege has
been, and can be used, to protect from disclosure “briefing statements,
recommendations, drafts of decisions or policy statements, comments to . . .
other agencies on proposed legislation or testimony, and notes of inter- or
intra-agency meetings.”49 But simply looking at how the privilege is applied
and what type of materials it may cover begs the larger question of whether the
privilege should be construed to cover all executive branch decisionmaking—

48. Petrol. Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1437–38. Two additional circumstances that would bar
assertion of the privilege also merit mention. First, “[e]ven if a document satisfies the criteria for
protection under the deliberative process privilege, nondisclosure is not automatic.” Texaco P.R.
Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 885 (1st Cir. 1995). “The deliberative process
privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need.” In re
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, “‘[e]ach time [the deliberative process
privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing
interests,’ taking into account factors such as ‘the relevance of the evidence,’ ‘the availability of
other evidence,’ ‘the seriousness of the litigation,’ ‘the role of the government,’ and the
‘possibility of future timidity by government employees.’” Id. at 737–38 (citations omitted). As
one court put it, “[a]t bottom, then, the deliberative process privilege is ‘a discretionary one.’”
Texaco P.R., 60 F.3d at 885 (citations omitted). Second, courts have recognized a “waiver by
incorporation” exception to the deliberative process privilege. See Tigue v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
312 F.3d 70, 81 n.6 (2d Cir. 2002). Under this doctrine, “[a]n agency may be required to disclose
a document otherwise entitled to protection under the deliberative process privilege if the agency
has chosen ‘expressly to adopt or incorporate by reference . . . [a] memorandum previously
covered by [the deliberative process privilege] in what would otherwise be a final opinion.’”
Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 356 (2d. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). “In such a circumstance, the document loses its predecisional and deliberative
character, and accordingly, the . . . privilege no longer applies.” Id.; see also Tax Analysts v.
IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d
666, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (privilege does not protect an agency’s body of “working law”). And
as the Supreme Court has recognized, when a document is adopted as policy by an agency, “[t]he
probability that an agency employee will be inhibited from freely advising a decisionmaker for
fear that his advice if adopted will become public is slight[,] . . . [to the contrary] agency
employees will generally be encouraged rather than discouraged by public knowledge that their
policy suggestions have been adopted . . . .” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161
(1975) (emphasis added). It should be noted however, that it remains unsettled as to whether
“waiver” generally, as may be applied to the attorney-client privilege, is applicable in deliberative
process privilege cases. See Texaco P.R., 60 F.3d at 885 n.8.
49. Memo from Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, DOI, to Chief of Staff, Assistant
Secretaries and Heads of Bureaus and Office (October 22, 1998) (on file with author). “The
privilege also protects other communications derived from these predecisional communications.”
Id.
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whether that be executive policymaking or agency rulemaking made subject to
judicial review by Congress. To examine this larger question, we first need to
understand the historical basis of the privilege, a topic to which we now turn.
B.

Historical Development of the Privilege

A relative newcomer to the list of recognized federal common law
evidentiary privileges,50 the deliberative process privilege has a mysterious and
unconventional history.51 Its roots lie in a now discredited 1841 decision of
the British House of Lords52 and a procedural regime designed to protect
sensitive military information.53 Once adopted, however, the privilege moved
seamlessly, with little or no careful consideration by the judiciary, to protect
internal communication involving nearly all aspects of executive branch
decisionmaking.54
The rationale behind the privilege appears to have been first articulated in
a decision of the British House of Lords.55 The case of Smith v. East India
Company56 involved a demand for documents reflecting communications
between a government appointed oversight body, the “Board of Control,” and
the East India Company.57 The Lords, after first concluding that the parties
could properly invoke the so-called “Crown privilege,”58 proceeded to fashion
a privilege to protect certain communications between government officials.59
In the words of the Lords, if such communications were “subject to be
produced in a Court of justice, the effect . . . would be to restrain the freedom
of the communications, and to render them more cautious, guarded, and

50. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 845; Jensen, supra note 12, at 563.
51. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1779.
52. See infra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 62–75 and accompanying text.
54. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 875. Professor Wetlaufer provides a well-researched,
detailed discussion of the history of the privilege, from its roots in English law and American
Military culture to rapid growth of the privilege in the American judiciary system. See id. at 856–
82. He frames the development of the privilege as a debate between advocates of “[s]ecrecy” and
defenders of “[d]emocracy and [a]ccountability.” Id. at 857 (noting that the music in this drama
is provided by two competing choruses, one singing “The Urge to Secrecy” and the other “The
Ode to Democracy and Accountability”).
55. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 858 (citing Smith v. East India Co., (1841) 41 Eng. Rep.
550 (Ch.)); Jensen, supra note 12, at 564; Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1779.
56. (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch.).
57. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 858.
58. See id. In England, the Crown privilege is normally asserted by the executive
department concerned but may be raised by the parties. The privilege is applicable where
disclosure would be harmful to national defense or good diplomatic relations. See Conway v.
Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910 (H.L.). For a review of the history of the privilege, see Burmah Oil Co.
v. Bank of England, (1979) 1 W.L.R. 473, 489–93 (A.C.).
59. Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 858.
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reserved.”60 The Lords continued by concluding that the communications at
issue “therefore . . . come within the class of official communications which
are privileged, inasmuch as they cannot be subject to be communicated . . .
without injury to the public interests.”61 Thus, the House of Lords invoked a
rationale very similar to what would be that of the United States Supreme
Court some 133 years later—that disclosure of predecisional, deliberative
material from the Executive Branch would inhibit frank and candid debate
among officials, which would injure the quality of government decisions.62
This British predecessor to the deliberative process privilege would not
make a second appearance for over a century. When it did reemerge, it would
do so both in Britain and the United States in the context of protecting military
secrets. In 1942, the House of Lords took up the case of Duncan v. Cammell
Laird & Co.,63 in which the survivors of a crew of a new military submarine
that was sunk during a test dive sought government documents pertaining to
the design and construction of the vessel.64 After the First Lord of the
Admiralty refused to provide the documents, the survivors brought the matter
to the House of Lords.65 The Lords sided with the military, holding that “the
rule that the interest of the state must not be put in jeopardy by producing
documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administrating
justice [that is] quite unconnected with the interests or claims of the particular
parties in litigation.”66 While the Lords did not directly rely on the Smith
decision, it appears that the rationale for allowing the government to withhold
the documents—injury to state interests—was of similar importance to the
Lords in both cases.67
In the United States, the deliberative process privilege would make its first
appearance around 1954, but not in the judicial arena. Instead, the rationale
behind the privilege was invoked in a political dispute between President

60. Smith, 41 Eng. Rep. at 552. This case is cited in Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 858 n.41.
61. Smith, 41 Eng. Rep. at 552.
62. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1975).
63. [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.).
64. Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 859.
65. Id.
66. Duncan, [1942] A.C. at 642, quoted in Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 859.
67. “[T]he public interest requires a particular class of communications with, or within, a
public department to be protected from production on the ground that the candour and
completeness of such communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be
disclosed in subsequent litigation rather than on the contents of the particular document itself.”
Duncan, [1942] A.C. at 635 (quoted in Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 859 n.43). Professor
Wetlaufer suggests that while there is no direct citation to Smith in the Duncan decision, the
“Duncan decision has subsequently been read to incorporate the deliberative rationale first
articulated in Smith.” Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 859. However, as discussed infra notes 98–
110 and accompanying text, an alternative view is that Duncan is more appropriately considered a
British version of the “state secrets privilege.”
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Dwight Eisenhower and Senator Joseph McCarthy during the course of the
Army-McCarthy proceedings.68 In ordering that the Army refuse to provide
the Senate Committee on Government Oversight any further oral or
documentary testimony during the course of the hearings, the President
invoked not a traditional separation of powers argument, but instead the
deliberative process rationale.69 President Eisenhower argued, “it is essential
to efficient and effective administration that employees of the Executive
Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other on
official matters . . . .”70 He continued by ordering the Secretary of Defense to
withhold certain information from the McCarthy Committee on the grounds
that it is “not in the public interest that any of their conversations or
communications, or any documents or reproductions, concerning such advice
be disclosed . . . .”71

68. Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 865–868. The Army-McCarthy hearings stemmed from
Senator McCarthy’s attempts in 1953 to gain access to the Army’s confidential files on loyalty
and security. See ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE
SENATE 244–49 (1970). “The army-McCarthy hearings sprawled out through nearly two months
of confusion and turmoil” and are probably best defined by the series of skirmishes they
ultimately covered. See id. at 254–63. The first skirmish involved the investigation of
communist infiltrators among civilians employed by the Army, including nearly seven year-old
discredited charges of espionage at Fort Monmouth. See ROBERTA STRAUSS FEUERLICHT, JOE
MCCARTHY AND MCCARTHYISM: THE HATE THAT HAUNTS AMERICA 114–17 (Marie Shaw ed.,
1972). The second involved the Army’s failure to take action against a dentist who had been
drafted into service, and ultimately promoted to Major, despite his refusing to answer several
questions on his routine loyalty form on the constitutional grounds of self-incrimination. Id. at
117–22. And finally, there was the accusation by the Army that the hearings were actually in
retaliation for the Army’s failure to give special treatment to the career of G. David Schine, and
McCarthy’s counterattack in which he claimed the Army was seeking to blackmail his committee.
Id. at 124–27. Ultimately the hearings ended any presidential possibilities for McCarthy, id. at
114, as reflected in his public opinion ratings throughout 1954. GRIFFITH, supra at 263 & n.57.
69. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 865–68; Jensen, supra note 12, at 566.
70. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to the Secretary of Defense Directing Him to
Withhold Certain Information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations (May 17,
1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
1954, ¶ 113, at 483 (1960).
71. Id. at 483–84. That the deliberative process privilege was first articulated in the United
States in response to the Army-McCarthy hearings adds irony to the privilege’s history, and to
Professor Wetlaufer’s battle between “secrecy” and “democracy and accountability.” Thus, on
one hand Senator McCarthy can be viewed as a defender of accountability, seeking to ensure that
the Executive Branch not withhold evidence of Army misconduct. As one historian noted, these
hearings “were unique in the annals of Congress and the nation. Never before had the polite
facade [sic] of parliamentary decorum been lifted to expose such a bewildering tangle of personal,
political, and constitutional issues. Never before had an audience of eighty million been made
privy to the inner secrets of government.” GRIFFITH, supra note 68, at 243. On the other hand,
the President’s response also seems rather appropriate to an investigation by a man who is now
villainized for his overzealous investigations of communists. Indeed, it is quite clear that
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Shortly after President Eisenhower asserted the deliberative process
rational against his political foe, the privilege was first recognized by the
courts in the case of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States.72 In
that case, the plaintiff alleged a breach by the United States of its contract to
sell war plants to Kaiser Aluminum and Reynolds Metal Company.73 During
the litigation, Kaiser sought documents from the General Services
Administration (GSA) relating to the Kaiser and Reynolds sales. In particular,
Kaiser requested:
all internal GSA reports, memoranda, or other documents concerning these
sales to Kaiser and Reynolds prepared by all employees or agents of the [GSA]
for intra-agency use, particularly prior drafts of the Kaiser contract with [GSA]
interpretation and justification thereof and similar papers in connection with
the claims. There was also sought the like intra-agency reports and
74
comparisons concerning the Reynolds contract.

In response, the GSA produced all but one document on “the ground that it was
‘contrary to the national interest.’”75 That one document was an advisory
opinion written by a Special Assistant to the War Assets Liquidator.76
In an opinion authored by retired Supreme Court Justice Stanley Reed,
sitting on the Court of Claims by designation, the court agreed with the GSA’s
decision to withhold the sole document in dispute by fashioning what is now
known as the deliberative process privilege.77 Relying on Duncan for support,
Justice Reed wrote that “[t]here is a public policy involved in this claim of
privilege for this advisory opinion—the policy of open, frank discussion
between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.”78 In the
opinion, the court crafted the parameters of the privilege, which essentially
survive to this day, from requiring assertion of the privilege by the agency

McCarthy was not providing the public with the “truth,” in that his usual tactics included the use
of fabricated evidence and violent personal attacks. See id. at 256.
72. 157 F. Supp. 939 (1958). According to one court, “Kaiser Aluminum occasionally
receives credit as the first federal case to recognize a deliberate process privilege.” Marriott Int’l
Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Most
scholars would give it unconditional credit as the first such case. See Jensen, supra note 12, at
566; Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1779; Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 869.
73. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 941–42.
74. Id. at 942.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 943.
77. Id. at 940, 946–48. Great weight has been given to the fact that the privilege was
fashioned by a former Supreme Court Justice. See Marriott Int’l, 437 F.3d at 1304 n.1.
However, it is unclear whether this alone should justify rationale and extensive use of the
privilege since 1958. See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
78. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946.
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head to allowing the privilege to be overcome by necessity, to recognizing that
the privilege protects advice, but not facts.79
C. The Unbridled Growth of the Privilege
Once articulated in Kaiser Aluminum, the use of the deliberative process
privilege by the Executive Branch, and its acceptance by the courts, spread like
“wildfire.”80 The privilege is now routinely invoked by the Executive Branch
as an evidentiary privilege in litigation,81 in response to public requests under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),82 to prevent information from getting
into the hands of Congress,83 and most recently, as justification for withholding
information from the administrative record in APA cases.84 The privilege is
also widely accepted by the state courts as a legitimate means to withhold
government documents from the public.85 In fact, the privilege has been

79. Compare id. with Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 2d 252,
258–60 (D.D.C. 2004) (discussing the rationale for the privilege and the notion that mere facts are
not protected by the privilege), and DCP Farms v. Espy, Civ. No. 2:94cv85-B-A, 1995 WL
1945518, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 10, 1995) (discussing the privilege and the policy underlying it).
80. Jensen, supra note 12, at 567.
81. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 848.
82. Id. at 878–79 (“[T]here has been occasion for a great [number of] FOIA [cases] to apply,
if not necessarily to assess, the general deliberative privilege.”); see also Kennedy, supra note 14,
at 1777 (“The deliberative process privilege is also [used] to thwart FOIA requests.”). Congress
enacted FOIA “in order to create a public right [to acquire] governmental information ‘from
possibly unwilling official hands.’” Dianna G. Goldenson, Comment, FOIA Exemption Five:
Will It Protect Government Scientists from Unfair Intrusion?, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311,
314 (2002) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)). FOIA provides the public a legal right
to request, following specified procedures, copies of public records maintained by federal
agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that disclosure
is the overriding purpose of FOIA, calling it a statute designed to “pierce the veil of
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of the Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citation omitted). However, while FOIA favors public
disclosure of governmental records, the statute does contain nine exemptions under which an
agency may withhold a particular record. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). Exemption 5 allows an
agency to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums [sic] or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5) (2006). “The Supreme Court has interpreted Exemption 5 as encompassing recognized
statutory and common law privileges, including the attorney work-product privilege, the attorneyclient privilege, and the deliberative process privilege.” Miles, supra note 29, at 1329.
83. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2008).
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. See Erin Hoffman, The Deliberative Process Privilege in Kentucky, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 485, 494–504 (2005). Hoffman analyzes the use of the privilege in context of
state open record statutes. Id. Some state courts have also embraced the privilege as a general
evidentiary privilege that can be used by a state government in the course of civil or criminal
litigation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Guyette, No. CV030081427S, 2004 WL 2669197, at *1 (Conn.
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asserted so successfully by the government that it took very little time before it
was simply assumed that the privilege is so “deeply rooted in [American
jurisprudence]”86 that its existence must be “uncontroversial.”87
Uncontroversial or not, several observations regarding the history of the
privilege can be made that suggest unbridled expansion of the privilege
deserves more than the “most perfunctory and stylized attention” its use has
received by the courts to date.88 First, there is the peculiar forum from which
the privilege first sprang—the Federal Court of Claims. It has been said that
this court, until its demise in 1982, had a historical bias toward extending
procedural protections to the Executive Branch89: “[T]he entire business of the
Court of Claims [was] the adjudication of suits against the United States for
money judgments.”90 According to the official history of the court, the Court
of Claims was a place where one could expect that “the Government, always
the defendant in the court, [had] an obvious lopsided advantage in

Super. Ct.. Oct. 29, 2004); Ostoin v. Waterford Twp. Police Dep’t, 471 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991); In re Integrity Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 1177, 1184 (N.J. 2000). Others, however, have
explicitly declined to endorse the deliberative process rationale as a blanket privilege on par with
the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges, and they instead have chosen to limit
circumstances of its use—like access to public records—addressed by their state legislatures.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48, 50–51 (Ill. 1998) (declining to
extend the privilege and stating that it is “strongly disfavored because [it] operate[s] to ‘exclude
relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings.’”)
(citations omitted); Marylander v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(refusing to extend the privilege beyond that allowed by statute and noting that unlike a public
records act case, a “party to pending litigation has a stronger and different type of interest in
disclosure”).
86. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1801; see Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct.
168, 173–74 (Cust. Ct. 1978); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., The Executive’s Right of Privacy: An
Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L. J. 477, 477 (1957) (noting that even in 1957 it
seemed strange that the question of the privilege had not been resolved).
87. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1770.
88. Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 875. Professor Wetlaufer argues that instead, most of the
energies of the courts have “gone into the development of rules related to the application of the
privilege.” Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773 (noting that the validity of the privilege
has gone “virtually unquestioned in the federal case law”). Notably, outside of acknowledging
(and accepting) the deliberative process rationale as incorporated by Congress in exemption five
of FOIA, the Supreme Court has never given the privilege any careful, analytical consideration or
endorsed its broader use outside of FOIA. See Jensen, supra note 12, at 567. This is in stark
contrast to the Court’s historical treatment of other common law privileges, such as the attorneyclient privilege and attorney work product privilege, where the court has stressed the need to
weigh the public interest in disclosure of evidence with the need for confidentiality. See infra
notes 289–96 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s discussion in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981), and
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–12 (1947)).
89. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 869–70.
90. Note, Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 527, 527 (1955).
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discovery.”91 In other words, it can be of no great surprise that the court would
grasp on to the far-reaching deliberative process privilege seemingly
articulated in the Duncan case as a new tool to protect the federal government
in litigation.92
Similarly, although great weight has been given to the privilege because
Kaiser Aluminum was penned by a former Supreme Court Justice,93 by the
time Justice Reed sat on the Court of Claims he, too, had already demonstrated
himself as an ardent defender of executive branch prerogative. In Touhy v.
Ragen,94 for example, Justice Reed and his Supreme Court colleagues were
faced with the question of whether a subordinate official in the Department of
Justice could rightfully refuse to obey a subpoena duces tecum on the grounds
that he was ordered not to respond by his superior, the United States Attorney
General.95 Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Reed upheld the
subordinate’s refusal to comply with the subpoena, finding that “[w]hen one
considers the variety of information contained in the files of any government
department and the [possibility] of harm from unrestricted disclosure in court,
the usefulness, indeed the necessity, of centralizing determination as to
whether subpoenas duces tecum will be willingly obeyed or challenged is
obvious.”96 Looking at this opinion and others, historians have concluded that
Justice Reed was “neither inconsistent nor even unpredictable” in that “[f]rom
the beginning, he has been a strong federal-government man, upholding its
laws and the orders of its administrative agencies, whether directed against
wealth or against personal freedoms of citizens . . . .”97 Thus, given that the
91.
(1978).
92.
93.
94.
95.

2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY 106

See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 859.
Marriott Int’l Resorts v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1304 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
Id. at 463, 467. The order at issue stated:
All official files, documents, records and information in the offices of the
Department of Justice . . . are to be regarded as confidential. No officer or employee may
permit the disclosure or use of the same for any purpose other than for the performance of
his official duties, except in the discretion of the Attorney General, The Assistant to the
Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General acting for him.
Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Order No. 3229, Disclosure or Use of
Confidential Records and Information, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920, 4920 (May 4, 1946). In the case, the
plaintiff, an inmate of the Illinois state penitentiary, instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in U.S.
District Court and sought documents in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
Chicago that he claimed contained evidence showing that his conviction was based on fraud.
Touhy, 340 U.S. at 464–65.
96. Touhy, 340 U.S. at 468.
97. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790
TO 1955, at 268 (1955). Justice Reed was given a seat on the Court as a reward for his work as
the Solicitor General, during which time he argued most of the big New Deal cases before the
Court with “patient passion that had caused him once to faint in the course of argument.” Id. at
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deliberative process rationale was first articulated by a court in which the
arguments of the federal government were likely to be given great deference,
the Kaiser Aluminum decision seems like a tenuous foundation for what has
become such a widely asserted government privilege.
Second, Justice Reed’s reliance on Duncan as justification for the privilege
was misplaced. Duncan involved the question of whether the government
could claim a privilege where documents sought by a party in the course of
litigation contained sensitive military information, the disclosure of which
could undermine national security.98 The House of Lords found that such a
privilege was available to the Crown.99 In the United States, this privilege is
known as the “state-secrets privilege”100 and can be “traced as far back as
1807.”101 The seminal case establishing the modern day reach of the statesecrets privilege is United States v. Reynolds, decided in 1953.102 Faced with
facts eerily similar to those in Duncan, the Supreme Court in Reynolds103 relied
heavily on the English precedent to lay out the basic procedural safeguards the
government must follow to invoke the privilege.104 The Court recognized that
too much judicial inquiry into whether the claim of privilege was valid could
force disclosure of the very information the privilege was meant to protect.105
Likewise, if the Court was to completely abandon judicial control over the
privilege, it would lead to intolerable abuses by the government.106 Thus, the
Court was concerned with fashioning a process that would balance the
government’s need to maintain secrecy—even from the court—with the need
for the court to maintain control over the circumstances appropriate for the
252. Once on the Court, Reed was alone among the Roosevelt-era Justices in his ardent belief
that “Uncle Sam could almost do no wrong.” Id. at 307.
98. D. C. M. Yardley, The Primacy of the Executive in England, 21 PARLIAM. AFF. 155,
159–60 (1967).
99. Id.
100. See Erin M. Stilp, The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding
Power, 55 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 831, 831 (2006) (“The privilege permits the government to
refuse discovery requests where ‘there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’”
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953))).
101. Id. at 833.
102. Id. at 834.
103. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). The case involved the crash of a military
aircraft on a flight to test secret electronic equipment. The widows of the civilian observers on
board the flight sued the United States for damages, and they sought through discovery the Air
Force’s accident investigation report and statements made by surviving crew members. The Air
Force objected on the grounds that the aircraft and its personnel were “engaged in a highly secret
mission . . . .” Id. at 2–5; see supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (discussing the
remarkably similar facts in Duncan).
104. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8 & n.15.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
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claim of privilege. It did so by requiring that the privilege be lodged by only
the highest, and presumably most accountable, government officials.107
In Kaiser Aluminum, Justice Reed imported the procedural regime
established to protect military secrets in Duncan into a rule to protect the
general deliberative process involved in executive branch decisionmaking. In
doing so, however, Justice Reed appears to have given no consideration to the
fact that the rational for protecting government information under the statesecrets privilege is sharply distinct from his desire to generally protect agency
communications in an effort to enhance the quality of decisionmaking. The
state-secrets privilege seeks to protect factual information, regardless of
whether communications are involved, because the release of such highly
secret military or diplomatic information might endanger the public or harm
the nation.108 With such high stakes riding on protecting the secrecy of this
information, it is arguably justified for the court to relinquish some control
over evidence in a case, even at the risk that the government will wrongly
withhold evidence.109 It is far less clear, however, that relinquishing judicial
safeguards is equally as warranted to merely protect “candid” and “frank”
internal agency discussions.110 This is of particular concern given the
significant number of government communications that may fall under the
deliberative umbrella, and, therefore, the relatively high possibility for abuse.
Finally, although the validity of the deliberative process privilege has gone
“virtually unquestioned in the federal case law” since Kaiser Aluminum,111 the
House of Lords has long since reversed itself and abandoned the privilege
107. See id. at 11. This privilege remains available to the Executive Branch today, separate
and distinct from the deliberative process privilege. See Bryan S. Gowdy, Should the Federal
Government Have An Attorney-Client Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 717–18 (1999)
(identifying the specific privileges available to the Executive Branch). It should be noted that
these two privileges are often grouped, along with the law enforcement secrets privilege, under
the general title of Executive Privilege. See Roberto Iraola, Congressional Oversight, Executive
Privilege, and Requests for Information Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and
Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1571 & n.63 (2002); see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729, 736–37 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In any event, according to one study, the use of the state-secrets
privilege, like the deliberative process privilege, is very much on the rise. Patrice McDermott &
Emily Feldman, Secrecy Report Card 2006: Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Government 7
(2006), http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2006.pdf [hereinafter Secrecy Report Card
2006]. “Between 1953 and 1976, the federal government invoked [the privilege] only six (6)
times. Between 1977 and 2000, administrations invoked the privilege 59 reported times. Since
2001, [the privilege] has been invoked at least 22 times.” Id.
108. Note, Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications: Institutional Privileges,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1592, 1592 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter Developments].
109. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
110. See Developments, supra note 108, at 1612 (noting that with regard to the problem of
“empirical validity: it is simply not clear that disclosures would actually chill communications
within many institutions”).
111. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773.
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articulated in Smith to the extent that it would protect internal government
communications solely to protect candor.112 As one Lord put it:
I cannot believe that any Minister or any high level military or civil servant
would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views in the
course of his duty on some subject . . . by the thought that his observations
113
might one day see the light of day.

Thus, the only real judicial precedent for the deliberative process privilege in
this country has long been overturned.
In short, there appears to be little historical or legal justification for a broad
privilege, which can only be invoked by the government, to generally withhold
from courts, litigants, Congress, and the public deliberative documents that can
shed light on the inner workings of the Executive Branch. But, moreover,
when we consider that the Congress has made an express declaration that the
courts, in order to perform their constitutional and statutory mandate to review
certain executive branch decisions (such as agency rulemakings), must have
sufficient access to the information in the agency’s decision-making record,
then, at minimum, one must seriously question the privilege’s use in judicial
review cases. With this in mind, let us now turn to the APA.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
A.

Background of the Act

Congress enacted the APA in 1946,114 “largely in response to the
tremendous and unprecedented [growth] of the administrative state during the
New Deal period and the concomitant backlash to this expansion [from] the

112. See Conway v. Rimmer, 1 All E.R. 874, 891 (H.L. 1968).
113. Id. at 915; see also Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England, 3 All E.R. 700, 724 (H.L.
1979) (“[T]he reasons, possibly oblique, . . . [given] for refusing production of communications
between the directors of the East India Company and the Board of Control in Smith v. East India
Co . . . must now be treated as having little weight, if any.”).
114. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Initial work on the federal APA actually “began in
1939 with the appointment of the U.S. Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure.” Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L.
REV. 297, 297–98 (1986). That committee was tasked with determining the need for reform in
federal agency procedure and practice. “Before [the] committee completed its work, however,
Congress passed the Walter-Logan bill, an administrative . . . reform effort that was endorsed by
the American Bar Association (ABA). In 1940 President Roosevelt vetoed [the Walter-Logan
Bill], stating that he wished to await the outcome of . . . work of the Attorney General’s
Committee” before approving any comprehensive administrative procedure legislation. Id. “That
committee filed its final report in 1941,” but the Second World War delayed any serious
consideration of administrative reform efforts. Id. “In 1946, with the war concluded, both houses
of Congress unanimously approved and President Truman signed the federal APA.” Id. Since

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

STANDING IN THE WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

369

legal and business communities.”115 The statute is often seen as a political
“compromise between New Dealers enthusiastic about the use of
administrative power” to address the country’s social needs and “conservative
critics who saw [such] power as a veil for [executive] tyranny.”116 Indeed, the
dramatic rise of the administrative state in the 1930s can be seen as a direct
challenge to the traditional system of checks and balances embodied in the
Constitution. In turn, the APA was the ultimate response to this challenge—an
attempt to restore the rule of law, and a system of checks and balances, on the
Executive Branch’s expanding authority. In this section, we explore both of
these events in order to more fully understand why the Executive Branch’s use
of the deliberative process privilege to withhold documents from a court
charged with reviewing agency rulemaking is a departure from the balance
struck in the APA that may have constitutional implications.
1.

Rise of the Administrative State

The presence and role of administrative agencies have grown so common
in American society that one commentator compared their impact on our daily
lives to that of “VCRs, suburbs, and advertising.”117 Even so, the political
legitimacy of administrative agencies remains unsettled even today in many
Americans’ minds.118 Thus, the question “Why is there an administrative
state?” is not merely an academic question, but has been observed to “reflect[]
the deepest of anxieties of our political culture.”119 Indeed, the existence of
administrative agencies defies our traditional expectations of a constitutional
form of government by undermining notions of separation of powers, due

that time, the APA has proven very durable, being amended only three times and warding off
many other attempts to change its structure. See William H. Allen, The Durability of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. L. REV. 235, 237– 41 (1986).
115. Marshall J. Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV.
337, 338 (1986).
116. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2080. As Justice Jackson noted, the
APA “represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to
rest.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
117. PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2004). Of
course, in today’s world the comparison is probably better made to DVDs or digital video
recorders, such as TiVo®.
118. Even in our time, the Supreme Court has seemed willing to question the constitutionality
of independent administrative agencies. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 920–22 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Maybe for this reason, commentators are willing to suggest that
administrative law remains (possibly forever) in search of its “intellectual bearings.” SCHUCK,
supra note 117, at 2; see also RONALD A. CASS & COLIN S. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxi (1987) (“Administrative law is a field that seems forever in
search of itself.”).
119. SCHUCK, supra note 117, at 7.
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process, and political accountability.120 So why do they exist? The answer, at
least initially, is rooted largely in the changing needs of the country as a result
of the Great Depression.
a.

The Great Depression and a Changing America

In the years leading up to October 19, 1929,121 the American economy was
a dichotomy. On one hand, the corporate world was booming in the 1920s.122
On the other hand, neither the working class nor farmers appeared to improve
their economic conditions to “any substantial degree in the ten years preceding
1929.”123 This led the influential economist John K. Galbraith to conclude in
1955 that the economy was “fundamentally unsound” in the years leading up
to the Depression, not merely due to the income disparity in American
society,124 but because this “highly unequal distribution meant that the
economy was dependent on a high level of investment or a high level of luxury
consumer spending or both [which] are subject, inevitably, to more erratic
influences and to wider fluctuations than the [daily] outlays of a $25-a-week
workman.”125
120. See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2072 (discussing the
incompatibility of law and administration and noting that “[t]he view that legal checks, in their
traditional form, are an indispensable constraint on regulatory administration [and] played a large
role in the constitutional assault on the administrative state . . .”). “Implicit in the United States
Constitution is the notion of limited government,” and the mechanism chosen by the Framers to
limit the expansion of governmental power is “the system of internal checks and balances.” E. P.
Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 797,
798 (1992). The Constitution distributes authority among the three branches of government—
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The Constitution seeks to coordinate, and protect, each of
the three branches. Most importantly, the separation of powers doctrine preserves this structure
by “calling into question the usurpation or subversion of the constitutional role of one branch . . .
by the actions of another.” Id.; see also LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (4th ed. 1976) (summarizing the separation of powers principle as “a
fundamental and valid dogma” whose “object is the preservation of political safeguards against
the capricious exercise of power”).
121. The start of the Great Depression is usually tied to the stock market crash on October 19,
1929, known as Black Tuesday. One scholar has stated that the moment “belongs to the
mythology of American Life . . . [because] [i]t possesses all the elements of drama, of personal
crisis, of concentrated symbolic value needed for the creation of the folklore and legends which
decorate the life of nations.” MARIO EINAUDI, THE ROOSEVELT REVOLUTION 49 (1959).
122. Id. at 26 (also noting that the net income of corporations filing federal tax returns
increased fifty percent between 1920 and 1929 and that there was a significant rise in actual
dividends paid to shareholders during this period as well).
123. Id. at 25–26.
124. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 182 (1955). Professor
Galbraith notes that in 1929, “the rich were indubitably rich.” The figures indicate that “the 5 per
cent [sic] of the population with the highest incomes in that year received approximately one third
of all personal income.” Id.
125. Id. at 182–83.
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At the same time, the Executive Branch, leading up to and during the early
part of the Great Depression, took a clearly laissez faire approach to the
economy.126 The presidential administrations during this period,127 while not
repealing many of the existing Wilsonian era social legislation, did not take a
position that it was appropriate for the federal government to use legislation (or
for that matter administrative rulemaking), particularly legislation that would
interfere with the free market, to address the economic woes of the country.128
These administrations sought to appeal to a certain type of American tradition,
namely to the values of individual freedom and ruggedness.129 In short, the
prevailing view of these administrations seemed to be that any bump in the
economic road, even one like the Great Depression, “could be overcome
without undue influence of government power with free enterprise.”130
A similar approach to government involvement in the economy was
embraced by American courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court,
during this era.131 As one scholar of the politics behind the Great Depression
states:
It seems certain that, during this long and critical period, roughly from 1890 to
1936, a period including both a phase of [economic] ascendancy and one of
deep crisis, the Supreme Court—moving away sharply from earlier nineteenthcentury positions built upon the strong foundations of Chief Justice John
132
Marshall[ ]—reinterpreted the meaning of the Constitution in a way to
133
weaken the power of government.

126. For a general discussion of the role of government during this period and the general
“hands off” approach by the Executive Branch, see EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 33–38.
127. This period consists essentially of the administrations of Presidents Harding, Coolidge,
and Hoover.
128. See EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 33–38. Even worse, apparently, than the government
interfering with the free market in the 1930s was the notion that the government would compete
with it. See id. at 35–38. This was the opinion voiced by President Hoover when he vetoed
legislation to establish a quasi-governmental entity, the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), to
develop and sell power in Tennessee. Id. at 35. At the time of this veto in 1931, the country was
already in the midst of a deepening economic crisis, with unemployment reaching seven million.
Id. at 37. Although the bill would have resulted in the construction of significant energy
infrastructure, which would be a source of steady employment in the region, the President stuck
by his principles that such social legislation was to “break down the initiative and enterprise of
the American People.” Id. at 36–37. Interestingly, it is exactly this type of legislation that
President Roosevelt would rely upon (including the TVA bill, which he later signed), that makes
up a good portion of the New Deal reforms. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
129. See EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 34.
130. Id.
131. For a general discussion of the role of courts during this period, see id. at 38–48.
132. Chief Justice John Marshall, the longest serving Chief Justice in Supreme Court history
(1801–1835), is credited with shaping the influence of the Judicial Branch, the right of the courts
to utilize judicial review to strike down unconstitutional legislation, and the roles of the federal
and state governments under the constitutional doctrines of supremacy and federalism. See Chief
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During this time, the views of the Supreme Court hemmed in both the
federal and state governments’ ability to enact social legislation. The federal
government’s efforts to exercise its authority to address economic issues were
repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional on the basis of the Court’s narrow
interpretation of federal powers under the “general welfare” and “interstate
commerce” clauses and on a broad assumption of surviving state power under
the Tenth Amendment.134 At the same time, state social legislation was
similarly thwarted on the grounds that it curtailed private property rights and
freedom of contract protected under the Due Process Clause.135 In essence,
what the Supreme Court did during this fifty year period before the New Deal
was to set “embarrassing limits” on legislative reform efforts by telling the
federal government on one hand that it was essentially limited in its delegated
jurisdiction, and, on the other hand, by telling the states that their exercise of
police power was rigorously limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.136
Needless to say, by October 29, 1929, America was strapped with a
government that was either reluctant (in the case of the President and Supreme
Court) or paralyzed (in the case of Congress and the States) from acting to
address the rapidly deteriorating economic condition of the country. The
reluctance of the Executive Branch came to a quick end in 1932 with the
election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the emergence of his New
Deal principles,137 the hallmark of which was an extensive slate of social

Justice Earl Warren, Foreword to CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL, at xiv–xv
(W. Melville Jones ed., 1956); Donald G. Morgan, Marshall, the Marshall Court, and the
Constitution, in CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL, supra at 171.
133. EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 204.
134. Id. at 205. For a partial list of the cases that struck down federal social legislation
seeking to address the American economy during this period, see id. at 207 n.2.
135. Id. at 40. According to Professor Einaudi, the Supreme Court struck down some 228
state statutes on the basis of the due process clause between 1890 and 1937. Id. at 205. As
another scholar put it:
[W]ell over a thousand of the Supreme Court’s full-dress decisions have revolved around
the little due process clause. [These cases most often deal] with corporations . . . who
claim[] through their lawyers that some duly enacted and fairly administered state law,
taxing them or regulating their business activities, “deprived” them of property “without
due process of law.” [As such], the Fourteenth Amendment[] . . . has become the last, and
quite often successful, resort of men or companies who stand to lose money through the
normal working of some state law, properly passed by a properly elected legislature,
properly signed by a properly elected governor, and properly put into effect by properly
chosen state officials, including judges—some law that perhaps clamps down on
sweatshops, or taxes big fortunes handed on at death, or orders a monopoly like an
electric company not to charge so much.
RODELL, supra note 97, at 148.
136. EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 40–41, 205–06.
137. For a discussion of how President Roosevelt changed the nature of the presidency by
reasserting executive power, see id. at 119–38.
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legislation aimed toward curing the economic depression and establishing
sufficient safeguards to ensure that future economic downturns would take a
lesser toll on the nation.138 The reluctance of the Court, however, would
persist a little longer, a spark that can only be called a constitutional crisis—
actually the first of two closely related constitutional crises in the span of a
decade between 1935 and 1945.
b.

The New Deal (Constitutional Crisis I)

Given the failure of the government to prevent the Great Depression (or
address it between 1929 and 1932), it is unremarkable that, at first, Roosevelt
and the New Dealers found the traditional separation of powers and system of
checks and balances were an obstacle to the enactment and implementation of
reforms at the national level.139 As a result, they believed that new
governmental bodies, largely combining powers once exercised only by
individual branches of government, were necessary to carry out this new
national agenda.140 More importantly, “[t]he New Deal reformers believed that
modern problems required institutions having flexibility, expertise, managerial
capacity, political accountability, and powers of initiative” well beyond that of
any one branch of government, particularly the courts.141

138. See A.A. Berle, Jr., The Social Economics of the New Deal, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 29,
1933, reprinted in THE NEW DEAL: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 38 (William E. Leuchtenburg
ed., 1968) (discussing the whirlwind of legislation and its impact on America during the New
Deal and noting that the aim of these folks was to introduce “a power of organization into the
economic system which can be used to . . . make sure that the burdens of readjustment are
equitably distributed, and that no group of individuals will be ground to powder in order to satisfy
the needs of an economic balance”); J. Frederick Essary, The New Deal for Nearly Four Months,
LITERARY DIGEST, July 1, 1933, reprinted in THE NEW DEAL: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra at 25–26. Indeed, the main theme of Roosevelt’s presidential campaign in the summer and
fall of 1932 was that the country would now implement through co-operative action (i.e.,
enactment of social legislation) what individuals and groups had failed to do for themselves,
namely adequately address the social and economic needs of the people. EINAUDI, supra note
121, at 78–79.
139. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2080.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2072, 2079; see also JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938),
reprinted in PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 11 (2d ed. 2004)
(“[A]dministrative agencies . . . were called into being when the political power of our democratic
institutions found it necessary to exercise some control over the varying phases of our economic
life.”). In this regard, the courts are particularly poorly suited to address economic crises. By
their very nature, courts decide individual cases based upon individual facts. This gives the
courts the “inability to maintain a longtime, uninterrupted interest in a relatively narrow and
carefully defined area of economic and social activity.” Id. at 12. Moreover, as courts of general
jurisdiction, courts have a broad knowledge of “things human and divine,” but not necessarily the
expertise to fully address “an extended police function of a particular nature,” such as the
economy. Id. Thus, it has been argued that in large measure, the twentieth century rise of a
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As the New Deal progressed under the leadership of Roosevelt, a large
number of administrative agencies came into being with the blessing of
Congress.142 These agencies were given enormous legal power to interpret and
execute often intricate new laws.143 Before the New Deal, regulatory activities
were largely discrete and limited in nature, primarily aimed at particularized
fields of economic activity.144 By the middle of the 1930s, however, the
Executive Branch, as well as Congress, had developed a regulatory system that
sought to correct the failing tendencies of the free market, and, exemplified by
agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), often embraced
comprehensive governmental planning as a tool for developing a social
infrastructure.145 Moreover, to an unprecedented extent, these governmental
bodies now exercised quasi-legislative (through rulemaking), quasi-judicial
(through interpreting the law and deciding issues brought by aggrieved
parties), and quasi-executive authority (through enforcing the law).146
Within a few years of the New Deal, however, Roosevelt and his
supporters would realize that the courts remained an obstacle to grand social
reforms on the principles of private autonomy and free markets.147 In addition
to maintaining its disapproving stance toward state and federal legislative
attempts to govern the economy,148 in the mid-1930s the Supreme Court turned
its constitutional guns specifically toward these emerging administrative
powers. In 1935, invoking the previously never exercised “non-delegation”
doctrine,149 the Court struck down two congressional attempts to transfer broad

massive administrative apparatus was a self-conscious repudiation of regulation through the
courts. See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2078.
142. EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 137. In addition to the TVA, Congress adopted legislation
creating, among others, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Export-Import Bank, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Federal Security Agency.
Id. Many others would, of course, follow.
143. Id.
144. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1252 (1986).
145. See id. at 1253.
146. See id. at 1264. As discussed above, before the New Deal a series of Supreme Court
decisions had set constitutional limits on Congress’s assignment of legislative duties to the
Executive Branch. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. Similarly, before the rise of
the regulatory state, the allocation of authority between the Executive Branch and the judiciary
was also rather clear in that “it was for the courts, not the Executive, to ‘say what the law is,’ at
least in litigated cases.” Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2078 (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
147. See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2080.
148. See EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 208.
149. Article I of the U.S. Constitution states: “All legislative Powers herein granted, shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 1, §1. The purpose of this
Article is to ensure that the legislature is not provided with an opportunity to divest its
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administrative authority to the Executive Branch under the National Industrial
Recovery Act.150 In doing so, the Court complained bitterly that these

constitutionally mandated authorities to the executive branch or any outside agency. Daniel J.
White, The Nondelegation Doctrine Revisited: Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 359, 362 (2002). Before 1935, the non-delegation doctrine itself consisted of a
series of decisions, dating back to the early 1800s, that spoke of the “non-delegable” legislative
power in Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85
(1932); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 58–59 (1922); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825); Aurora
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). Notably, in none of these cases leading up
to 1935 had the Court disapproved the delegation in question. Instead, the Court generally took
one of two approaches. First, the Court determined that where the delegation was one of
discretion as to the facts, not the law, it was not an unconstitutional delegation of power. See
Clark, 143 U.S. at 692–93. Second, and more importantly, the Court chose to distinguish “those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act
under such general provisions to fill up the details.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. See
also Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. at 85 (“That the legislative power of Congress
cannot be delegated is . . . clear. But Congress may declare its will, and, after fixing a primary
standard, devolve upon administrative officers the ‘power to fill in the details.’”). It is this later
approach that laid the foundation for the Court’s articulation of the “intelligible principle” test
which is now used as the basis for testing the constitutionality of a congressional delegation. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (discussed infra note 162).
150. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Panama Refining involved the grant of discretionary power to the
President under Section 9(c) of the Act to prohibit the transportation of certain petroleum
products among the states over certain permitted amounts. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 405–
06. While the facts of the case focused primarily on the President’s authority under the Act, the
Court took special pain to point out that if the Congress could authorize such discretion by the
President, there would be nothing preventing similar delegations of authorities to other officials
and agencies. Id. at 420–21. Indeed, even under Section 9(c), it was the Department of Interior
that acted as Administrator in recommending to the President what limits should be placed on
petroleum transportations among the states. Id. at 409. Schechter Poultry, however, clearly
involved the grant of authority to an administrative agency (through the President) to develop
“codes of fair competition.” Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521–22, 524. In that case, the Court
struck down the Live Poultry Code developed by the Administrator for Industrial Recovery on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally delegated legislative power reserved only to Congress. Id. at
522, 541–42. Finally, it should be noted that these two cases can be distinguished in at least one
significant way from past decisions of the Court upholding delegation of the “details” of a
program to the Executive Branch. See supra note 149. The past cases all considered delegations
in matters such as presidential authority in foreign affairs or agency management of public
property. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 (2d ed.
2001). The delegations at issue in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were not so limited in
subject matter, but instead involved delegations pertaining to the type of broad-scale agency
regulation of private economic conduct that troubled the Court so much leading up to 1935. See
id. This led Professor Ernst Fruend in 1928 to comment that “‘the appropriate sphere of
delegable authority is where there are no controverted issues of policy or of opinion . . .’”(citing
ERNST FRUEND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 218 (1928)). Id.
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delegations lacked procedural safeguards to the extent that the actions of the
Executive Branch would be wholly outside the constitutional system of checks
and balances.151
Needless to say, the Court’s view of administrative authority was a serious
blow to Roosevelt’s reform efforts.152 To the New Dealers, the Court simply
missed the broader, and more pressing issues facing the country.153 Yes,
public regulation might very well inflict some loss of profits and freedom of
economic movement in the short term, but in the long run it would broaden the
security of the nation, and ultimately expand private gains.154 In any event,
Roosevelt was not to be entirely deterred. Shortly after his landslide reelection
in 1936, Roosevelt announced his well-known “court-packing” plan of
February 1937 with the intent of increasing the number of Supreme Court
Justices from nine to fifteen.155 With these new justices selected by him,
Roosevelt was certain that the Court would no longer pose a problem to the
implementation of the New Deal.
Although by July 1937 the court-packing plan had failed to gain passage in
the Senate, events at the Court itself transpired to make the plan superfluous.156
Most notably, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts executed their famous
“switch in time that saved nine”157 by reversing first their position on state
economic legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish158 and then on the
New Deal legislation in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.159 In fact, after

151. See, e.g., Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431–33. Similarly, in Schechter Poultry, the
Court noted that unlike previous delegations in which Congress set up special procedures for the
agency to develop rules—requiring notice and hearing, findings of fact supported by adequate
evidence, and judicial review—in the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress inappropriately
“dispenses with this administrative procedure and with any administrative procedure of an
analogous character.” Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 533.
152. EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 115.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 206. As Professor Einaudi states:
The issue can be summed up in this way: Was it proper for the Supreme Court to
identify itself to such a large extent with one view of economic freedom and of economic
policy, and to nullify, therefore, so many of the intermittent, tentative, and scattered
efforts that legislative bodies were making to keep economic life within changing and
better defined boundaries of public policy?
Id. at 205.
155. Michael Comiskey, Can A President Pack—Or Draft—The Supreme Court? FDR and
The Court in The Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1994). The
actual name of the plan was the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937. SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 31 (1937).
156. Comiskey, supra note 155, at 1046.
157. Id.
158. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
159. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). There is little reason to believe that Roosevelt’s court-packing plan
was the sole impetus for the dramatic change of opinions by Chief Justice Hughes and Justice
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repeatedly striking down New Deal legislation,160 the Court would uphold
social and economic measures in each of the eighteen cases before it between
December 1936 and May 1937.161 Moreover, the Court would not again
invoke the non-delegation doctrine to strike down New Deal era delegations of
administrative power to the Executive Branch.162
In short, the tensions between the President and the Court brought about by
the Great Depression undoubtedly created a political crisis that resulted in what
has been called a “Constitutional Revolution.”163 The New Deal reforms, and
their eventual acceptance by the Court, opened the door for the burgeoning,
modern-day administrative state.164 The enormous power that would be

Roberts. Since both had changed their minds several months before the announcement of the
court-packing plan, it is most likely that Roosevelt’s “overwhelming electoral triumph” in 1936
“induced their change of heart.” Comiskey, supra note 155, at 1047. See also EINAUDI, supra
note 121, at 219 (noting that Roosevelt believed that the “change had been due to political
pressure exercised on the Supreme Court, culminating with his plan for judicial reform.”). In any
event, as a subsequent member of the Court, Justice Robert H. Jackson, would observe, “the
spectacle of the Court that day frankly and completely reversing itself and striking down its
opinion but a few months old was a moment never to be forgotten.” Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
160. In three terms between 1933–34 and 1935–36, the Court struck down or limited New
Deal measures in eleven of thirteen cases. Comiskey, supra note 155, at 1046.
161. Id.
162. White, supra note 149, at 364; see also Krauss, supra note 120, at 799 & n.6. The
Supreme Court itself provided a concise history of its nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence
between 1928 and 1989, stating that since 1935, the year it invalidated two statutes as excessive
delegations, the Court has “upheld . . . without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power
under broad standards.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989). In Mistretta, the
Court recognized that its past precedent established that “[s]o long as Congress ‘shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.’” Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
406 (1928)). The Court continued by stating that:
Applying this ‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional delegations, our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives. . . . Accordingly, this Court has deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and
the boundaries of this delegated authority.’
Id. at 372–73 (citations omitted). In 1998, however, the Court finally found a delegation that was
just too broad to ignore, finding that that the Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat.
1200 (1996), which authorized the President to selectively void portions of appropriation bills,
was an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative vestment of Congress. Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998).
163. EINAUDI, supra note 121, at 212.
164. Rabin, supra note 144, at 1262–63. As the Supreme Court would later observe, the rise
of the administrative state “has been the most significant legal trend” in the twentieth century.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952). However, the Court’s acceptance remained a
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quickly vested in numerous administrative agencies would soon result in a
second constitutional crisis—the need to reestablish checks and balances over
this “fourth branch” of the government.165
B.

Rise of the Administrative Procedure Act
1.

The Growing View of Administrative Agencies as “Unruly
Administrators” (Constitutional Crisis II)166

By the late 1930s, the presence of specialized administrative agencies was
quickly becoming an accepted fact of life in America.167 To this end, the New
Deal programs, which took an active role in economic and social policy, were
quite welcomed by the American public.168 Even so, the new administrative
state would continue to be scrutinized, particularly by the legal and business
communities, into the late 1930s and early 1940s.169 Of course, with very little
legal and political success in challenging the necessity for a federal
bureaucracy,170 there was a major shift in terms of the debate over the
country’s new regulatory system by 1938.171 Gone was the wholesale
disagreement over the appropriate realm of administrative action;172 in its place
was a growing apprehension over the largely unchecked agency decisionmaking process.173

reluctant one for some time. Id. (observing further that the rise of administrative bodies has
“deranged our three-branch legal theories as much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles
our three dimensional thinking”).
165. See Krauss, supra note 120, at 837; see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN.
MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMM. WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS,
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT
AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS, S. DOC. NO. 91–49, at 346 (1st Sess. 1970) (“They
constitute a headless ‘fourth branch’ of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible
agencies and uncoordinated powers. They do violence to the basic theory of the American
Constitution that there should be three branches . . . and only three.”).
166. I must attribute the term “unruly administrators” growing out of the New Deal regulatory
reforms to Professor Rabin, supra note 144, at 1265.
167. Id. at 1263. See also 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 280–
81 (1998) (noting the solid acceptance of the New Deal by the American people and the
repudiation of Republican constitutional values in the 1930s).
168. See Rabin, supra note 144, at 1252 (“The public came to look upon [the] government as
its guarantor against acute economic deprivation.”).
169. For a discussion of this turbulent period for administrative agencies, see generally Walter
Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986) and
Rabin, supra note 144, at 1262–64.
170. See supra notes142–64 and accompanying text.
171. Rabin, supra note 144, at 1263.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Led in large part by leaders of the American Bar Association, the young
regulatory system would suffer a “barrage of criticism” over the perceived
inadequacies of agency procedure and the limitations of judicial review.174
There was a growing notion that decision-making processes of these agencies
suffered as a result of their “unwholesome combination of judicial, executive,
and legislative powers,” and that their presence was “rapidly and seriously”
undermining the position of the Judicial Branch of the federal government.175
These beliefs were captured in the so-called “tendencies” of administrative
agencies cataloged in a 1938 report by the ABA Special Committee on
Administrative Law.176 Among them were the tendencies:
(1) to decide without a hearing; (2) to decide on the basis of matters not before
the tribunal; (3) to decide on the basis of preformed opinions; (4) to disregard
jurisdictional limits; (5) to do what will get by; (6) to mix up rulemaking,
investigation, and prosecution, as well as the functions of advocate, judge and
177
enforcement authority.

This debate was turned up a notch when opponents, led by the ABA
Special Committee’s new chairman, Roscoe Pound, sought to move the
argument over control of administrative law into one between “the good guys
against the bad guys,” or maybe more properly put, between American and
Marxist values.178 It was argued by Pound and others that the regulatory
system, which lacked an adequate body of authoritative grounds and guides to
decisionmaking, would result in “administrative absolutism,” and the end of
rule of law“a Marxian idea very much in vogue [at the time] among a type
of American writers.”179 As the President-elect of the ABA would state the
argument in 1938, “[t]he forces of Absolutism and those of Democracy are at
grips throughout the world,” and therefore fellow lawyers must “join the
‘titanic struggle’ against those ‘progressives,’ ‘liberals,’ or ‘radicals’ who
desire to invest the national Government with totalitarian powers in the teeth of
Constitutional democracy.”180
While in hindsight it is likely that this “Marxist” view of administrative
agencies was overly alarmist, it is rather clear from a constitutional perspective
that the criticism of the regulatory process was not wholly unjustified. As
administrative power expanded in this country, the decisions of these agencies
would come to impact nearly every aspect of the American system of values,

174. Id. Chief behind this criticism was the leadership of the ABA’s Special Committee on
Administrative Law. See generally Gellhorn, supra note 169.
175. See Gellhorn, supra note 169, at 220.
176. Rabin, supra note 144, at 1264.
177. Id.
178. See Gellhorn, supra note 169, at 221–22.
179. Id.
180. Id. (footnote omitted).
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with important consequences on personal rights and freedoms.181 Moreover,
the lack of sufficient oversight by either Congress or the courts after the New
Deal would mean that the discretion of these agencies to act was essentially
unbound.182 Thus, it became undeniable that our constitutional system of legal
checks and balances was at risk unless constraints were instituted on regulatory
administration.183
By 1939, under tremendous pressure from the ABA, Congress was
compelled to explore legislation to rein in the power of these agencies.184 And
not being deaf himself to the rising tide of procedural criticism, President
Roosevelt instructed the Attorney General to appoint a committee to report on
the “need for procedural reform” in the field of administrative law and “to
make a ‘thorough and comprehensive study’ of then ‘existing practices and
procedures, with an eye toward detecting any existing deficiencies and
pointing the way to improvements.’”185 While much of this constitutional
upheaval over the administrative state was momentarily forgotten as a result of
World War II,186 in the end it was the passage of the APA in 1946, and its
establishment of procedural safeguards and independent judicial interpretation

181. See Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 97
(1996). Professor Shapiro notes that the expansion of government during the New Deal “was
extraordinary both in the degree of intrusion on private autonomy and its premise that the
capitalistic market system was fundamentally flawed.” Id. He goes on to say, “New Deal
agencies violated such cherished constitutional concepts as separation of powers (because of the
combination of functions), due process (because administrative adjudication was more informal
than its judicial counterpart), and political accountability (because of the many ‘independent’
agencies).” Id. These concerns also would not escape the Supreme Court, even after passage of
the APA. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
182. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1676–81 (1975).
183. See Shapiro, supra note 181, at 97 (noting that although it is hard to understand from the
perspective of today’s highly regulated society, there was a “social and constitutional threat posed
by the New Deal”).
184. In 1940, Congress passed the Walter-Logan Bill seeking to curtail administrative power.
See 86 CONG. REC. 13, 815–16 (1940) (noting the House of Representatives’ passage of the
Senate’s amendments to the Bill). The bill enhanced judicial review and established internal
checks on agency decisionmaking. See James M. Landis, Critical Issues in Administrative Law:
The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1085–86 (1940). The bill was vetoed by
President Roosevelt. Shapiro, supra note 181, at 98. For a thorough examination of the WalterLogan Bill, see Landis, supra.
185. Gellhorn, supra note 169, at 224–25 (footnote omitted).
186. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1641 (1996) (“Congress and the
nation fought foreign enemies rather than native administrative bureaucracy.”).
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of the law, which were the necessary “quid pro quos” for the creation of the
administrative state.187
2.

A New System of Checks and Balances

The APA applies to all administrative bodies of the federal government
except those expressly exempted.188 It establishes procedural requirements
concerning public access to agency law, agency rulemaking procedure, agency
adjudication procedure, and, in many aspects most importantly, judicial review
of agency action.189 The Act generally divides the universe of agency action
into two classes—rulemaking and adjudications—and subjects each class to
separate procedural schemes.190 Rulemaking involves, as the name implies,
the issuance of agency rules and regulations, which are generally defined as
“statements of general applicability prescribing law or policy.”191
Adjudication, on the other hand, involves the issuance of agency orders, which
can be defined as statements of particular applicability that determine the rights
of specified parties that then may be relied upon by agencies as precedent.192

187. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2072–73 (emphasis added); see also
Shapiro, supra note 181, at 98 (“The ultimate adoption of the APA stilled the crisis over the
legitimacy of the administrative state.”).
188. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
189. Bonfield, supra note 114, at 303 (“The first broad concept embodied in the federal APA
and emulated by the states concerns the desirability of a general and comprehensive APA.”
(emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court has expressly stated in particular that the rulemaking
provisions in the APA are maximum requirements, and that while courts may not generally
impose additional safeguards, “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the
exercise of their discretion.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
190. Bonfield, supra note 114, at 308; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947) [hereinafter AG
MANUAL] (“[T]he entire [APA] is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and
adjudication.”).
191. Bonfield, supra note 114, at 325; AG MANUAL, supra note 190, at 14 (“Rule making is
agency action which regulates the future conduct of either groups of persons or a single person; it
is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future but also because it is
primarily concerned with policy considerations.”).
192. Bonfield, supra note 114, at 325; AG MANUAL, supra note 190, at 14–15
(“[A]djudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and liabilities. . . .
[I]t may involve the determination of a person’s right to benefits under existing law so that the
issues relate to whether he is within the established category of persons entitled to such
benefits.”). There has been often conflicting criticism of the rulemaking and adjudication
dichotomy established by the APA. One view, for instance, is that the adoption of some agency
rules might benefit from a more fact-intensive process, such as taking of oral evidence. Bonfield,
supra note 114, at 309. Indeed, some states do engage in an adjudication type approach to certain
rulemakings. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-2-6 to 70-2-7 (2007); N.M. CODE R. §
19.15.14.1205 (Weil 2007) (regulations of the New Mexico Oil and Gas Commission), available
at http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/NMAC; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 728 (1970) (utility rate setting
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The APA further breaks down both rulemaking and adjudication into two
procedural varieties—formal and informal. In taking formal action, an agency
must act “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”193 Sections
556 and 557 of the APA contain a fairly elaborate set of trial-type procedural
requirements for formal agency actions that parallel closely a judicial
proceeding.194 The Act provides for the right to an agency hearing and for the
right of all interested parties to make argument and offer evidence.195 In this
way, the Act seemingly calls for agencies to provide for an assured minimum
level of due process when persons are hauled before administrative agencies.196

in California). Others, however, argue that greater use of rulemaking, and consequently less
adjudication, is more preferable for several reasons. Bonfield, supra note 114, at 309. First,
adjudications lack broad public participation, which will constrain the information available to the
decision maker. Id. at 326–28. Second, the subject of the adjudication may be unwilling or
unable to make certain arguments that may bear on sounder policymaking. Id. at 327. Finally, it
is argued that rules are fairer in that they are normally prospective in nature (adjudications are
retrospective) and likely to apply more uniformly to a broad and defined class of persons. Id. at
330–31.
193. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (2006). Determining when a formal agency hearing is
required has turned out to be a difficult undertaking, even for the most seasoned administrative
law expert. With regards to formal rulemaking, the Supreme Court has stated that “the actual
words ‘on the record’ and ‘after . . . hearing’ used in § 553 [are] not words of art, and that other
statutory language having the same meaning could trigger the [formal hearing] provisions of §§
556 and 557 in rulemaking proceedings.” United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,
238 (1973). According to Professor Lawson, despite the Court’s admonishment, “in the more
than thirty years since [Florida East Coast Railway] was decided, no statute that does not contain
the magic words ‘on the record’ has been found [by a court] to require formal rulemaking.”
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 219 (4th ed. 2007). Thus, “[a]part from the
few rulemaking statutes that contain an express ‘on the record’ requirement, formal rulemaking
has virtually disappeared as a procedural category.” Id. at 219–20. With regards to formal
adjudication, the Supreme Court “has never decided a case involving the language that organic
statutes must contain in order to trigger formal adjudication.” Id. at 221. Instead, the courts of
appeals have offered us several “dueling presumptions.” Id. at 233. While some courts have
appeared willing to presume, subject of course to rebuttal, that “any language in an organic statute
calling for a ‘hearing’ triggers formal adjudication,” other courts presume, again subject to
rebuttal, “that the restrictive rule of [Florida East Coast Railway] applies to adjudications as well
as to rulemakings.” Id. In 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals announced a
third approach, essentially deferring to an agency’s determination of whether a hearing is required
where the organic statute is ambiguous. Id.; Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
194. See Rabin, supra note 144, at 1265; Bonfield, supra note 114, at 320. This arguably is a
direct result of the intense concern that agencies were undermining the federal judiciary and
leading to the eroding of personal rights. See supra notes 173–83 and accompanying text. See
also Rabin, supra note 144, at 1263–65.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)–(c) (2006).
196. See Alexander Dill, Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case
For The Delegation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L.J. 953, 969 (1984).
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The procedural requirements in the APA for informal rulemakings are
dramatically different than those called for in sections 556 and 557 of the
APA. The APA requires that an agency engaged in informal rulemaking
provide notice to the public of the proposed rule, an opportunity for public
comment, and the public issuance of a statement of basis and purpose of the
final rule adopted.197 These requirements, which are commonly referred to as
“notice-and-comment rulemaking,”198 impose a significant duty on an agency
and serve to promote agency accountability and reasoned decisionmaking.199
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recently stated, the
notice and comment requirements in informal rulemakings
are designed (1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to
diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to
give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to
support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial
200
review.

With regards to informal adjudications, the APA is simply silent. Unlike
the minimal “notice and comment” procedures in section 553 applicable to
informal rulemaking,201 the APA establishes “no procedural constraints on
informal agency adjudication[s]. . . .”202 In such cases, a party aggrieved by an
agency’s informal adjudication likely only has two possible remedies. The
first would be to allege a violation of his or her constitutional right to due
process, which does apply to informal agency adjudications.203 The second is
to seek judicial review of the agency’s substantive decision in the courts.
Thus, the APA also calls for judicial review of all final administrative
actions—rulemakings and adjudications, both the formal and informal
varieties.204 It is the judicial review provisions of the Act in which the courts
are reestablished as an essential check on the power of the Executive
Branch.205
Indeed, the Act gives the courts two important roles in the administrative
process. First, Congress restored the courts’ role as the branch of government

197. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c); Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
198. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 6 (4th ed. 2006).
199. Reno, 57 F.3d at 1132.
200. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
201. LAWSON, supra note 193, at 323.
202. LUBBERS, supra note 198, at 6.
203. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 256 (2d ed.
2001).
204. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006); Rabin, supra note 144, at 1265–66.
205. See Cass R. Sunstien, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 394, 433 n.149 (1982); see also Stewart, supra note 182, at 1676–79.
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primarily responsible for interpretation of statutes.206 Section 706 of the APA
expressly states that, to the extent necessary, “the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions. . . .”207 Through this provision, the APA reflects back on that most
hallow of our Framers’ belief about the Executive Branch—that “those who
are limited by law ought not to be entrusted with the power to define the
limitation.”208
Second, the APA establishes the courts as the decider over whether an
agency acted within its authority, and within reason, in making its decision.
Section 706 provides the courts authority to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action” found to be: (1) in regards to rulemaking, “arbitrary, capricious,

206. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2080–81.
207. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). However, in modern administrative law, courts often give
substantial deference to agency interpretation of the law where the text of a statute is ambiguous
or where the text of the statute does not clearly address a specific issue (known as legislative
“gaps”). See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of
Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1275, 1281–82. This principle flows from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). At issue in
that case was the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision under the Clean Air Act to allow
“bubble” definitions of pollution sources subject to regulation. Id. at 840. The bubble rule allows
polluters to treat entire plants as a single source, even though the plant may consist of several
individual pieces of equipment that emit air pollutants. Id. Environmental groups vehemently
objected to this enlarged definition of a stationary source. See id. at 859, 864 (discussing how
respondents, a collection of environmental groups, opposed the EPA’s bubble rule and were
waging a “policy battle” in a “judicial forum”). In upholding the “bubble” definition (which is
not within the four corners of the Clean Air Act (see id. at 838; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628 (2000))),
the Court set forth a two part test for reviewing agency interpretations of the law:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it
is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. 842–43. The Chevron doctrine has been much analyzed, criticized, and
glorified. See, e.g., Callahan, supra (analyzing how Chevron has been applied and suggesting
how it ought to be applied in the future); Krauss, supra note 120, at 817–20; Sunstein, Law and
Administration, supra note 16; Frank LaSalle, Note, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc.: Making the Case for Broader Application of Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 28 AKRON L. REV. 349 (1995); Stephen M. Lynch, Note, A Framework for Judicial
Review of an Agency’s Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469.
208. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 16, at 2077.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

STANDING IN THE WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

385

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law;”209 (2) in
excess of constitutional or statutory authority;210 (3) in violation of established
procedures;211 and (4) with regards to adjudications under sections 556 and 557
of the Act, “unsupported by substantial evidence.”212 Under this scope of
review, the courts are also an essential check on the power of the Executive
Branch by protecting the citizenry from decisions made only in the self-interest
of administrators or on the behalf of powerful, private interest groups.213
In conclusion, through procedural safeguards, and to a greater extent
through the availability of judicial review, the APA provides at least “a
measure of assurance that the overall [administrative] process has been
conducted with regularity and due deliberation” and within the bounds of the
law.214 Indeed, it is through this single statute that “countless thousands of
federal adjudicatory and rulemaking proceedings are conducted each year.”215
Given its role in rebalancing power between the Executive and Judicial
Branches, it has been said that “the APA has achieved quasi-constitutional
status.”216 More importantly, however, for over sixty years it has stood alone
as a bulwark—whether in word or deed—against administrative absolutism in
this country.217
III. IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF “OFF THE RECORD” RULEMAKINGS SOUND
POLICY?
The question to be examined in Part III is whether the Executive Branch,
through the deliberative process privilege, has made a renewed bid to increase

209. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
210. Id. § 706(2)(B)–(C).
211. Id. § 706(2)(D).
212. Id. § 706(2)(E).
213. See Cass Sunstein, Fractions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
VA. L. REV. 271 (1986), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55 (Peter H.
Schuck ed., 1994).
214. Krauss, supra note 120, at 825–26. Thus, since passage of the APA in 1946:
The exercise of governmental power by administrative agencies is held in check by four
principal mechanisms: (1) [the remaining] structural constraints imposed under the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers; (2) statutory constraints set forth generally
in the [APA] and specifically in each agency’s organic legislation; (3) the requirement [as
evidenced in section 554 of the APA] that individuals be treated fairly in conformity with
the standards of procedural due process; and (4) the institutional role of judicial review to
assure agency adherence to applicable legal standards.
Id. at 797.
215. Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on
California’s New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 297, 297 (1986).
216. Id.
217. See Mathew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1188 (2000).
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its power vis-à-vis the judiciary (as well as the American people), which is
contrary to both the express legal mandates of the APA, as defined by the
Supreme Court, and to sound public policy. The focus in addressing this
question will lie solely on the assertion of the privilege by the government
during judicial review of informal agency action in which the primary standard
of review is the “arbitrary and capricious” test. Of particular concern is the
privilege’s impact on review of notice and comment rulemakings,218 which are
subject to the procedural requirements of section 553 of the APA.219
In general, in the modern era of administrative law it is through informal
rulemaking that agencies within the Executive Branch have tended to make
wholesale changes to public policy in areas affecting the environment,
education, public health and safety, communications, and other social and
economic aspects of American life.220 Unfortunately, there is mounting
evidence that the Executive Branch is using the deliberative process privilege
to frustrate judicial review by redacting information from administrative
records that provide the agency’s underlying rationale for rulemaking
decisions, and arguably as a subterfuge to cover up decisions that are being
made largely on political grounds without regard to whether such decisions are
legally or scientifically sound.221 Equally alarming is that no court has given

218. See LUBBERS, supra note 198, at 6–7.
219. Specifically, section 553 of the APA establishes the minimum procedures applicable to
agency informal rulemaking, including: (1) publishing, in the Federal Register, notice to affected
persons of the agency’s intent to promulgate a rule; (2) solicitation of comments on the proposed
rule by interested parties; and (3) promulgation of the final rule coupled with the issuance of “a
concise general statement of [the agency’s] basis and purpose” of the final rule. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)–(c) (2006).
220. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
38, 38 (1975). Informal rulemaking has become the primary procedural tool used by agencies to
make future changes in governmental policy that will impact large segments of the population or
the economy. See id. As one author has put it:
Through the rulemaking process pass the sum and substance of the hopes and fears of this
democratic nation. We will understand it, our government, and ourselves better when we
treat rulemaking as the most important source of law and policy for the conduct of our
daily lives. It will occupy that status unless the improbable occurs and we find some very
different way to govern ourselves.
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE
POLICY 279 (2d ed. 1999). It should also be noted that while both formal and informal
rulemaking are available to an agency under section 553 of the APA, formal rulemaking
procedure is rarely, if ever, utilized by modern administrative agencies. See Edward Rubin, It’s
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 106–07
(2003) (noting that formal rulemaking “has turned out to be a null set” in that given the
“impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely requires this technique,
and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare cases where the statute seems
to do so”).
221. See infra Part III.B.1.
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any serious consideration to whether the privilege should have ever been
extended to cases involving judicial review of rulemakings under the APA.222
If the courts were to take a close look at this question, it seems likely that the
only possible conclusion is that the use of the privilege is not legally justified
given the APA mandate that the courts review “the whole record,” and its use
is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s so-called “hard-look” doctrine of
judicial review.223 Use of the privilege in these cases, at best, will only further
erode public confidence in the federal government, and, at worst, will
undermine or destroy the safeguards put in place by the APA to protect against
administrative absolutism in this country.224
A.

Judicial Review of Agency Informal Rulemakings Under Section 706 of
the APA
1.

The APA’s (Two) Standard(s) of Review

As any administrative law scholar or student can attest, the existing legal
precedent that addresses the appropriate standards applicable to judicial review
of agency action is, at best, a quagmire.225 Over the decades since the adoption
of the APA, and particularly after 1970, courts have struggled to understand
both the applicability and scope of the various standards of review articulated
by the Supreme Court.226 Even so, the actual text of the APA provides two
possible standards a court may use in reviewing an agency’s substantive

222. See infra Part III.B.2.
223. See infra Part III.B.3.
224. See infra Part III.B.4.
225. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 221 (1996) (“Judicial review doctrine . . . has
undergone several transformations, ricocheting between extreme deference and intense scrutiny
with intermittent, not always successful, attempts to merge the two.”). Judge Wald provides an
excellent history of the debate regarding the appropriate standard of review since 1946, and
concludes that the primary concerns have remained unchanged, and that there remains deeprooted controversy over the role of the courts in reviewing administrative action. Id. at 221–30.
226. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1051–52 (1995) (noting that
landmark decisions by the Supreme Court pertaining to judicial review have broken down and/or
been ignored by lower courts). The scope of confusion regarding the applicability of particular
standards of review is eloquently revealed (and some would argue resolved) in then-Judge
Scalia’s opinion in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which is discussed in more detail below. See
infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text. Similarly, Judge Wald also provides a luminous
examination of the struggle courts have engaged in to establish the scope of review to apply, with
a seemingly illogical attempt to accommodate both judicial deference to, and scrutiny of, the
agency within the same judicial doctrine. Wald, supra note 225, at 229–30.
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determinations,227 and the Supreme Court has provided sufficient guidance on
both standards so as to establish at least the general parameters of judicial
review applicable today to informal rulemaking.
The first is the substantial evidence test, which is alleged to be the more
rigorous of the two.228 Under this test, an agency’s factual determinations
must be upheld by the reviewing court if supported by “evidence in sufficient
quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared
premise.”229 The Supreme Court, in cases that predate the APA, has stated that
“[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, and “means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”230 This standard of review is an evidentiary standard,231
akin to that which a court of appeals might apply to the factual determinations
made by a trial court or jury.232

227. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006); Mathew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial
Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 544 (1986). It could be argued that the APA actually establishes three
possible standards of review. See Pedersen, supra note 220, at 46–47. However, as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, the third standard, “unwarranted by the facts,” is authorized by section
706(2)(F) in only two circumstances: (1) when the action is adjudicatory in nature and (2) in a
proceeding to enforce non-adjudicatory agency action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). Neither situation can arise in an agency’s informal rulemaking.
Of course, courts are often tasked with more than just reviewing the substance of an agency rule.
For instance, a court may be tasked with reviewing the agency process used to promulgate a rule
to determine if it complied with the law. Such review is clearly authorized by the APA. See §
706(2)(D); see also Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1574 (10th Cir. 1994).
Similarly, the courts have devised additional standards of review not expressly called for in the
APA. For instance, under the Chevron doctrine, courts apply the “now-familiar two-step”
formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court to review agency interpretations of statutes the
agency is entrusted by Congress to implement. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and
Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 313
(1996). For purposes of this paper, we are concerned with judicial review of the substantive
decision under section 706 of the APA, for which the court is required to review “the whole
[administrative] record.” § 706.
228. See McGrath, supra note 227, at 541.
229. Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 11, 43 (1994).
230. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (“[The evidence] must be enough to
justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.”). For a more in-depth discussion of the substantial
evidence test, see Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,”
64 HARV. L. REV. 1233 (1951); Kunsch, supra note 229, at 42–45.
231. William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 829, 835, 850 (2005).
232. Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of
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The second test has been dubbed the “arbitrary and capricious” test233 or
“hard look” review.234 This test is clearly the squishier of the two, and comes
into play when an agency is called upon by Congress to make the type of
policy-related determinations that often occur in rulemaking proceedings.235 In
one of the first Supreme Court cases to directly consider the applicable scope
of review of an agency informal rulemaking,236 the Court held that all agency
actions “must be set aside if the action was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law’ or if the action failed
to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.”237 The Court
went on to state that under these “generally applicable standards” of the APA,
a reviewing court must engage in a “substantial inquiry” in the agency’s
determination.238 To uphold the agency’s decision under the arbitrary or
capricious test, a court must be able to determine that the decision was based
on a “consideration of the relevant factors” and that there was no “clear error
of judgment” on the part of the agency.239 While commentators generally
agree that ultimately the scope of review “is narrow and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency,”240 it is equally clear that the
agency is not shielded from “a thorough, probing, in-depth review” of its
decision by the court,241 and that the rationality of the decision is the central
focus of the reviewing court.242

Judicial Review “On the Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 195 (1996); see also Kunsch,
supra note 229, at 42 (noting that the substantial evidence test is also used in Washington state
courts “to decide whether or not to uphold a trial court’s findings of fact” and in federal court for
“reviewing factual determinations [made] by a jury”).
233. See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 229, at 40 (also noting that the term should properly be
phrased “arbitrary or capricious”)(emphasis added).
234. See Lawson, supra note 227, at 324; Wald, supra note 225, at 227.
235. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(agreeing with the government that the substantial evidence rule applies to factual determinations
while inferences of policy are weighed in terms of “arbitrariness or irrationality”); Lawson, supra
note 227, at 322–25 (noting that while there are potentially four ways to treat legislative-like
policy determinations made by agencies, modern courts have embraced hard look review with
“vigor”).
236. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (stating that
the action at issue in the case was “nonajudicatory, quasi-legislative in nature” (emphasis added)).
237. Id. at 413–14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 415.
239. Id. at 416.
240. Justin Winquist, Comment, Arbitrary and F^@#$*! Capricious: An Analysis of the
Second Circuit’s Rejection of the FCC’s Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC (2007), 57 AM. U. L. REV. 723, 734–35 (2008).
241. See Young, supra note 232, at 190 (footnote omitted).
242. Breger, supra note 115, at 354; see also Wald, supra note 225, at 233–34 (“‘Arbitrary
and capricious’ has turned out to be the catch-all label for attacks on the agency’s rationale, its
completeness or logic, . . . or lack of evidence in the record to support key findings.”).
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Which Standard Applies?

Post-Overton Park, the question that naturally arose with regard to these
two standards of review in APA cases was: “Which test should a court apply in
a particular case?” At first, scholars and courts applied what was considered
the “simple model” set forth in section 706 of the APA and seemingly
endorsed by the Supreme Court: the “arbitrary or capricious” standard was to
be used for judicial review of informal agency actions, while the “substantial
evidence” standard was to be used for review of formal, record-producing
agency actions.243 It was particularly believed that application of the
substantial evidence standard to informal rulemaking was not possible because
notice and comment rulemaking lacks the necessary adversarial process needed
to produce formal record evidence (and thus, an administrative record).244
Instead, informal rulemaking, again viewed more as an agency policymaking
exercise, was considered best reviewed by a court to simply determine if the
agency acted within the bounds of rationality.245
In truth, however, it is clear that in many rulemakings today the decisionmaking process includes both fact-finding and policymaking by the agency.246
Accordingly, the perceived difference between the two standards, which were
inherent in application of the simple model of section 706, has “not withstood
the test of time.”247 Instead, as articulated by then-Judge Scalia in 1984, courts
have come to see the scope of review provisions of the APA as cumulative, not
separate.248 In other words:

243. McGrath, supra note 227, at 541 & n.2.
244. Id. at 542–43 (noting that it was originally considered that “rulemaking did not lend
itself to a weighing of the evidence” because “[r]ulemaking lacks the adversarial procedures that
transform inconsistent data into reliable evidence that is more susceptible to substantial evidence
review”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)
(stating that “the basic requirement for substantial-evidence review” is that the agency action be
“designed to produce a record that is to be the basis of agency action”).
245. See McGrath, supra note 227, at 547–48.
246. Probably the best explanation of the “hybrid” nature of many agency rulemakings can be
found in Judge McGowan’s 1973 opinion review of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s industrial exposure asbestos rule. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In that case, OSHA was statutorily mandated to establish
protective standards for worker safety. Id. at 470–71. On one hand, OSHA did hold evidentiary
hearings to determine if substantial evidence existed to determine the risk of asbestos to worker
health. Id. at 472–73. On the other hand, where the evidence indicated that “reliable data is not
currently available with respect to the precisely predictable health effects” of asbestos, OSHA
remained obligated to establish some regulatory limit. Id. at 475. While such policy
determinations are “not susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation by reference to
the record as are some factual questions,” they are nonetheless subject to review by the court. Id.
247. McGrath, supra note 227, at 548.
248. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

STANDING IN THE WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

391

an agency action which is supported by the required substantial evidence may
in another regard be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”. . . . [Similarly,] [w]hen the arbitrary or
capricious standard is performing that function of assuring factual support,
there is no substantive difference between what it requires and what would be
required by the substantial evidence test, since it is impossible to conceive of a
“nonarbitrary” factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not
substantial in the APA sense—i.e., not “enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn . . . is
249
one of fact for the jury. . . .”

Thus, in what has been labeled the “convergence theory,”250 when reviewing
informal rulemakings under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard, courts today
will require not only that the agency supply a “reasoned basis for its action, but
also that substantial evidence in the record support any factual determinations
made by the agency in the course of the rulemaking.251
3.

The Role of the Administrative Record

Today it is rather black letter law that judicial review of informal
rulemaking is to be based upon the whole of the administrative record.252 But
this was not always the case. Before Overton Park, the notion that a court
must utilize the administrative record during judicial review was reserved
almost exclusively for cases in which the agency had engaged in a formal,
adjudicatory-type process.253 In reviewing informal agency action before
1970, courts applying the arbitrary or capricious test would merely assume the
existence of facts as stated by the agency in its justification of the rule to the
court.254 As one scholar has put it, “[t]he notion of reviewing a rule adopted in
informal proceedings based on the administrative ‘record[,]’” which is now
seen as “the yardstick by which the arbitrariness or rationality of the agency’s
action is measured[,]” was at one time “looked upon as something of a
contradiction in terms.”255

249. Id. at 683–84 (citations omitted).
250. McGrath, supra note 227, at 552–53.
251. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683–84. Judge Scalia would go so far as to say that the
distinction between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is now
“largely semantic.” Id. at 684.
252. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 115, at 354.
253. See Pedersen, supra note 220, at 62–64 (discussing the change spawned by Overton Park
from a judicial rule based upon a “procedural” record consisting of material properly placed into
evidence during the administrative process to a “historical” record consisting of an ad hoc effort
by the agency to reconstruct for the court the basis of a particular action).
254. Breger, supra note 115, at 354.
255. Id.
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This too changed with Overton Park. In that case, the Supreme Court
declared that, in the context of informal agency action, judicial review by a
court must be made “on the full administrative record” before the agency at the
time it made the decision.256 It has often been pointed out that this requirement
is at odds with the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement just a few pages earlier
in the Overton Park opinion that in informal agency proceedings there is no
mechanism for generating a formal record.257 Indeed, in choosing to require
on-the-record review of informal agency actions, the Court clearly glossed
over the fact that, in contrast to the procedural record-compiling of trial courts
and administrative proceedings, the APA does not require an agency to
develop a “focused and defined” record as part of the notice and comment
rulemaking process.258
Be that as it may, it is one of Overton Park’s “formalizing innovations” to
make it clear that while informal proceedings “are not on the record in the
technical sense of the APA, there is, nevertheless, a record in another
sense.”259 Thus, Overton Park has come to stand for the proposition that the
agency make available to the court all the actual documents and information
that were before the agency at the time that it made its decision.260 This loose,
non-procedural definition of the record, however, has led to intense confusion
and criticism over what actually should or should not go into the administrative
record261—confusion which, no doubt, has contributed to the rise of the
deliberative process privilege as a means of excluding information that
contributed to rulemaking from the administrative record.

256. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
257. Young, supra note 232, at 190 (noting that the portions of Overton Park which bear on
the review of the record by a court “brim with contradictions” and setting forth the inconsistent
language from the opinion); see also Pedersen, supra note 220, at 62–63 (elaborating on the
possible intent behind the Court’s self-contradiction).
258. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (notice and comment rulemaking), with §§ 554–557
(formal adjudications). Section 557(c) of the APA expressly states that:
The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception presented. All
decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record
and shall include a statement of –
(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record . . . .
§ 557(c). It has been said that the central loss occurring after the adjudicatory model was
discarded in favor of notice and comment rulemaking was not the loss of cross-examination or
oral testimony in particular, but rather the loss of a “focused and defined record which all the
procedures used in adjudication were intended to produce.” Pedersen, supra note 220, at 61.
259. Young, supra note 232, at 208.
260. Id.; see also Pedersen, supra note 220, at 62–63.
261. LAWSON, supra note 193, at 597; see also Pedersen, supra note 220, at 64; Young, supra
note 232, at 208.
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The Deliberative Process Privilege Frustrates Judicial Review
1.

The Rise of the Deliberative Process Privilege in Section 706 Cases

The past decade has witnessed a marked rise in the use of the deliberative
process privilege in APA cases under section 706. Of course, no empirical
study exists regarding the exact number of APA cases in which the Executive
Branch has invoked the privilege. Nor is such a study likely possible, given
that, as with many of the procedural issues that come before the courts,
disputes over completeness of the rulemaking record are not always resolved
by published court cases.262 But even a cursory search of available cases on
Lexis or Westlaw shows that the privilege, while scarcely seen in reported
APA cases before 1990, has been invoked in well over three dozen reported
decisions since 2000.263
One area of law in which it is possible to chart the growth of the
deliberative process privilege in recent years is in cases arising under the
federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).264 Since 2000, the privilege
has been invoked in numerous cases brought under the ESA265 to challenge the
Department of the Interior’s decision to either not list (or delist) species whose
existences are threatened or to reduce habitat protection for species already on

262. See Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (Or Not) of Appellate Rulings: An Evaluation of
Guidelines, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 41, 100–01 (2005) (explaining that technical and
procedural matter are reason for a court not to publish); see also C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A.
CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 122–23 (1996) (observing that
pre-trial rulings are “rarely published” and that they are “largely immune from appellate court
contradiction”).
263. A Lexis search of the federal court database using the terms “administrative record,”
“deliberative process privilege,” and “administrative procedure act,” resulted in a total of 52
cases. Of these, 2 cases were dated prior to 1990, 10 cases between 1990 and 2000, and 40 cases
were dated after January 1, 2000. A Westlaw search of the same terms resulted in 61 total cases.
Of these, 11 cases were dated prior to 1990, 15 cases between 1990 and 2000, and 35 cases were
dated after January 1, 2000.
264. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
265. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (D.N.M.
2004); Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2002); Maine v. Norton,
208 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D. Me. 2002); Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. C05-11128C, 2006 WL
1207901, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2006); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. Civ. 01409, 2002 WL 1207901, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2002). There is also an unquantifiable, but very
likely extensive, number of unpublished ESA challenges invoking the privilege as well. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Completion of the Administrative Record at 3, Wash. Toxics Coal.
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (Civ. No. C04-1998C);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
N.M. Wilderness Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Civ. No. 04-530 (D.N.M. Oct. 25,
2004) [hereinafter ESA SJ Motion] (on file with author).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

394

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:349

the endangered species list.266 These cases starkly demonstrate the trouble
with allowing the privilege to be asserted in section 706 APA cases. Under the
ESA, the government must make scientific evaluations regarding the status of
a species, relying solely on the use of “the best scientific and commercial data
available.”267 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has further recognized an
obligation “to document their evaluation of information that supports or does
not support a position [on a species] being proposed as an official agency
position” and that these evaluations must “rely on the best available
comprehensive, technical information regarding the status and habitat
requirements for a species.”268
A written evaluation of this type, regarding the decision made about a
species under the ESA, along with the supporting data, undoubtedly constitutes
part of the “record as a whole” before the agency. Moreover, this (supposedly)
objective evaluation of existing data relevant to the species would not appear
to implicate any discretionary policy decision for which the deliberative
process privilege would appear applicable. To the contrary, it relies on
technical, objective, and factual information that is not covered, in any case, by
the deliberative process privilege.269 Indeed, in preparing this evaluation,

266. The ESA is “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). The
ESA imposes certain duties on the Secretary of the Interior to protect species (and their habitats)
that have been formally listed as either “endangered” or “threatened.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
A species is defined as “endangered” when it is in “danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range . . . .” Id. § 1532(6). A species is defined as “threatened” when it
is “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future . . . .” Id. § 1532(20).
The Secretary of the Interior has generally delegated responsibility for carrying out the ESA to
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. 50 C.F.R. §
402.01(b) (2007).
267. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). As stated in the government’s own policy on standards
for information under the ESA, FWS biologists must review “all scientific and other information
that will be used” in order “to ensure that any information used by the [Fish and Wildlife and
National Marine Fisheries] Services to implement the [ESA] is reliable, credible, and represents
the best scientific and commercial data available.” Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards Under the
Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271, 34,271 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife].
268. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
269. See Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1438 (D.C. Cir.
1992); see also Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that
opinions of “scientifically trained persons” are only exempt if they reflect “the deliberative
process of decision or policy making”); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (“Purely factual reports and scientific studies cannot be cloaked in secrecy . . . .”); Sw. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 170 F. Supp. 2d 931, 940 (D. Ariz. 2000) (noting
that the disclosure of factual information about birds would not have an adverse effect on agency
decision-making processes).
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Congress has expressly declared that the government may not consider any
political or economic factors when carrying out its legal obligations under the
ESA.270
Even so, the government has repeatedly and regularly asserted the
privilege to withhold from the record information bearing on species subject to
ESA.271 For many years there was justifiable speculation that the redacted
information related to wrongful (and arguably illegal) consideration of
political, economic, and special interest concerns of the Executive Branch
regarding the protection of endangered species.272 We now know with
absolute certainty that such politically-motivated considerations were in fact
being withheld from the record with regard to ESA rulemakings.273 This is
arguably the most publicly-known use of the deliberative process privilege by
the Executive Branch to interfere with a court’s ability to review an

270. See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1225–26 (E.D. Cal. 2003); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 13 (1978) (“[I]ndividuals
charged with the administration of the act do not have the legal authority to weigh the political
importance of an endangered species.”).
271. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., ESA SJ Motion, supra note 265, at 7–9; UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE 15 (2004) (discussing the political misuse of science
under the ESA); WILLIAM SNAPE III ET AL., DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, SABOTAGING THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION USES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO
UNDERMINE WILDLIFE PROTECTION 16 (2003) (addressing “ESA cases in which the Bush
administration unlawfully abandoned sound science in favor of rewarding its corporate
supporters”); Noah Greenwald, Editorial, Speakout: Species Act Interference Clearly
Documented, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 3, 2006, available at http://www.rocky
mountainnews.com/news/2006/dec/03/bspeakoutb-species-act-interference-clearly/ (addressing
illegal political reversals of recommendations by Fish and Wildlife Service scientists on species
under the ESA); Letter from Alden Meyer, Union of Concerned Scientists Director of Strategy
and Policy, and Jeff Ruch, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility Executive
Director, to Congressmen Henry A. Waxman and Nick Rahall (Feb. 9, 2005) (addressing a recent
poll of government scientists regarding political pressure to change results or recommendations
within federal agencies).
273. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:
JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS (2007),
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/PROGRAMS/esa/pdfs/doi-ig-report_
jm.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF INVESTIGATION]. In the end, all blame was placed on a single
Department of Interior employee—Deputy Assistant Secretary Julie MacDonald—who resigned
just after release of the Inspector General’s report and days before a House Congressional
Oversight Committee announced it would hold a public hearing on her violations of the
Endangered Species Act, censorship of science, and brutalization of U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service staff. E-Wire Press Release, Embattled Interior Official Julie MacDonald Resigns In
Wake of Inspector General Report (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.ewire.com/
display.cfm/Wire_ID/3894.
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administrative rulemaking.274 Unfortunately, a review of these ESA cases, as
well as other cases invoking the deliberative process privilege to withhold
information from the administrative record, shows that the Executive Branch
has gotten away with such tactics largely because the courts have nearly
universally failed to give any serious consideration to the propriety of the
assertion of the privilege in these types of APA rulemaking challenges.275
2.

Courts Have Not Seriously Scrutinized the Escalating Use of the
Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases

In one of the earliest APA deliberative process privilege cases, the District
Court for the District of Columbia sought to recognize the tension between the
“general rule that judicial review of administrative action is to take place upon
the ‘whole record’” and the proposition that it is “generally true” that the
government is entitled to the deliberative process privilege “to promote
freedom of expression among civil servants.”276 That court went on to observe
that the “indiscriminate use of the ‘deliberative process’ privilege to justify
expurgation of administrative records may frustrate the process of judicial
review of agency action under the APA.”277 The Seabulk court, however,

274. Ironically, after concluding that wrongdoing occurred within the Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Department Inspector General found, not that the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s
manipulation of scientific findings for political and economic purposes was illegal or that
withholding such information from the courts was necessarily wrong, but that the chief problem
was the sharing of “nonpublic information to private sector sources, including the California
Farm Bureau Federation and the Pacific Legal Foundation.” REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, supra
note 273, at 2.
275. Such perfunctory treatment by the courts of invocation of the deliberative process
privilege in APA cases is, of course, consistent with the historical development of the privilege in
general. See supra Part I.C.
276. Seabulk Transmarine I, Inc. v. Dole, 645 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D.D.C. 1986). The Seabulk
case involved an informal agency adjudication in which the plaintiffs, operators of marine vessels
used to transport corrosive liquid chemicals in foreign commerce, sought a subsidy from the
Federal Maritime Subsidy Board, a subdivision of the Maritime Administration of the
Department of Transportation. Id. at 197. Under federal law, subsidies of this kind are
discretionary and thus decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. As discussed below, to the extent the
plaintiffs sought review to determine if there was substantial evidence supporting the factual
determinations of the Subsidy Board in denying the subsidy, the government’s withholding of
deliberative materials may have been appropriate under the so-called Morgan doctrine. See infra
Part III.B.2.b. However, the court proceeded to review the government’s decision under the
“arbitrary or capricious” standard. Seabulk, 645 F. Supp. at 197. Accordingly, the court’s
observation of the tension between the privilege and the court’s obligation to review the whole of
the record is certainly relevant to any discussion of the privileges used in review of informal
rulemaking. See supra Part III.A.1.
277. Seabulk, 645 F. Supp. at 202; accord Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d
9, 21 n.10 (D.D.C. 2002). The Norton court noted in dicta that the government’s “failure to
provide these [deliberative process] documents that should have been included in the original
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avoided this tension (but did not resolve it) by using Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to devise a rather novel approach to the problem. The
court held that should the defendant agency fail to include the disputed
documents “in full” in the administrative record, the court would simply deem,
for purposes of the case, that the documents fully supported the plaintiffs’
position, whether “they do, in fact, or not.”278
In contrast to Seabulk, other courts have seemingly just assumed that the
privilege must apply in APA cases.279 These courts rationalize their decision
to sustain the privilege either through general citation to precedent
acknowledging the privilege’s “common law” roots280 or its purported
inclusion in the so-called Morgan doctrine.281 These rationalizations, however,
are insufficiently supported by the courts to allow the continued withholding of
Administrative Record raises further doubts that it has provided the complete Administrative
Record” and that “[g]iven the deficiency in the Administrative Record, it is questionable whether
the Court would be in a position to adequately address the Service’s conclusions under the APA.”
Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 21 n.10 (citations omitted).
278. Seabulk, 645 F. Supp. at 202. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) reads in relevant
part:
Sanctions in the District Where the Action Is Pending. (A) For Not Obeying a Discovery
Order . . .
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be
taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims[.]
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
279. See generally Conservation Law Found. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 864 F. Supp. 265, 273
(D.N.H. 1994) (applying the privilege without analysis); Maine v. Norton, 208 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67
(D. Me. 2002) (same); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. Civ. 01-409, 2002 WL
32136200, at *2–4 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2002) (same); Safari Club Int’l v. Babbitt, No. 91-2523,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18183, at *27–30 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1994) (same).
280. See Ariz. Rehab. Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 185 F.R.D. 263, 269 (D. Ariz. 1998); Modesto
Irrigation Dist. v. Gutierrez, No. 1:06-cv-00453, 2007 WL 763370, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9,
2007). It is generally accepted that the APA’s “whole record” requirement is nonetheless subject
to legitimate claims of privilege by the government. See Ariz. Rehab., 185 F.R.D. at 267.
Interestingly, there is also little analysis by the courts as to the basis for the general exception that
information subject to common law privileges, such as the attorney-client or attorney work
product privileges, may be withheld from an administrative record. See generally Nat’l Courier
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(“Authority is sparse on the question of what internal agency memoranda are properly part of the
record. . . . The proper approach . . . would appear to be to consider any document that might have
influenced the agency’s decision . . . subject to any privilege that the agency properly claims as
protecting its interest in non-disclosure.”); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,
No. Civ.A. 04-824, 2006 WL 197461, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2006) (“[T]his Court has found no
case detailing the method by which an agency can establish that certain documents should not be
contained in the administrative record because they are deemed privileged . . . .”).
281. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 156 F.3d 1279, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409
(1941), for the assertion that “[a]gency deliberations not part of the record are deemed
immaterial”); supra Part III.B.2.b.
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deliberative materials from the administrative record in the context of judicial
review under the arbitrary or capricious standard.
a.

The Privilege’s “Common Law” Roots

A good example of a court blindly accepting the government’s assertion of
the deliberative process privilege as an established common law privilege can
be found in Arizona Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala.282 In that case, a
group of health care institutions that provide patient rehabilitation care
challenged the repeal of certain rules by the Department of Health and Human
Services that allowed them to recover from Medicare the lower of their actual
costs or charges for services.283 After agreeing that review of the repeal of the
rule was subject to judicial review under the arbitrary or capricious standard of
the APA,284 the government moved for a protective order on the grounds that
certain documents to the rulemaking record “are protected from release and
inclusion in the administrative record by the ‘deliberative process’
privilege.”285 In response, the court simply cited, without any analysis of the
privilege’s application to APA cases, existing precedent from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia that “[o]ne of the traditional evidentiary
privileges available to the Government in the civil discovery context is the
common-sense, common-law deliberative process privilege.”286
There are considerable factual and legal problems with the court’s
conclusion in Arizona Rehabilitation that the deliberative process privilege is a
“traditional . . . common sense, common law” privilege that should be applied
in APA cases. As an initial matter, the deliberative process privilege lacks the
pedigree necessary to consider it established in American law.287 To do so
would certainly ignore its dubious history in both this country and in
England.288 More importantly, even if the privilege had roots as a traditional
evidentiary privilege, existing law does not condone applying the privilege to
cases seeking judicial review under the APA absent a rigorous examination by
the court of the consequences to the judicial system and the public interest.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs the development of privileges in
federal court.289 Traditionally, the development of a new privilege under Rule

282. Ariz. Rehab., 185 F.R.D. 263 (D. Ariz. 1998).
283. Id. at 265.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 267.
286. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also, Modesto Irrigation Dist. v.
Gutierrez, No. 1:06-cv-00453, 2007 WL 763370, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007).
287. See supra Part I.C.
288. See id.
289. Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1983).
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
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501, or the expansion of an existing one to cover new forms of evidence, has
encountered strong scrutiny by the courts.290 Courts have been careful to
recognize that the application of evidentiary privileges can impact both “the
interest of the public and the resisting party in preserving privacy in the matter
sought to be discovered.”291 In the seminal case, Hickman v. Tayor,292 for
instance, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether information
obtained by an attorney, such as oral and written witness statements in the
course of litigation, was privileged from discovery by the opposing party.293 In
considering whether to adopt what is now commonly known as the attorney
work-product privilege, the Court was faced with two competing interests: (1)
the need to protect “a person’s files or records, including those resulting from
the professional activities of an attorney” and (2) “public policy [that] supports
reasonable and necessary inquires” as part of the litigation.294 The Court found
that it was necessary to carefully balance these two competing interests, which
in the Court’s words “is a delicate and difficult task.”295 Since Hickman, the
Court has continued to demand that there be a careful balancing of the need for
the free flow of information in the judicial forum against the necessity of
private communications in each new area in which a privilege has been
encouraged by a party.296
Similarly, with regards to APA cases, both the challenging party and the
reviewing court “have a strong interest in fully knowing the basis and
circumstances of an agency’s decision.”297 Accordingly, courts have found that

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
290. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 & n.18 (1974) (“[Privileges] are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”).
291. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 249 (3d
ed. 1985).
292. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
293. Id. at 497.
294. Id.
295. Id.; JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 291, § 5.9, at 248.
296. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981) (scrutinizing the
expansion of the attorney-client privilege to cover certain communications within the corporate
structure); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189–90 (1990) (scrutinizing (and rejecting)
expansion of the self-evaluative privilege to cover internal investigations by organizations subject
to employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1953) (scrutinizing the development of a state secrets
privilege).
297. Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
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“the ‘whole’ administrative record . . . consists of all documents and materials
directly or indirectly considered by agency decision-makers and includes
evidence contrary to the agency’s position.”298 If this is a correct description
of the record in APA cases, which it certainly is,299 it then defies imagination
(as well as Supreme Court precedent) that a court would so casually authorize
removal of documents from the record on the mere utterance by an agency of
terms like “deliberative,” “pre-decisional,” or an assertion of the need for
“candor.” This is particularly true given that there is not a jot of evidence that
any government employee would hide his or her honest views in the course of
rulemaking absent the availability of the privilege.300 Regardless, it is the
failure of the courts to undertake this balancing of the need for disclosure
during judicial review against the need to protect bureaucratic candor that
undermines courts’ acceptance of the privilege in APA cases to date.301

298. Ariz. Rehab. Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 185 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D. Ariz. 1998) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
299. See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion on the administrative record in arbitrary or
capricious review cases under the APA.
300. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 MO.
L. REV. 279, 312–13 (1989); supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it
appears that some government employees have actually taken measures to avoid assertion of the
privilege by their superiors in hopes of actually getting their opinions and views in the
rulemaking before the public. This has been done, for instance, where federal employees
purposefully leave their names off of an internal document. Where a document fails to identify,
at minimum, the author, recipient, or list of reviewers, an agency cannot plausibly—or legally—
suggest that candor will be impinged. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir.
1994) (“But, most importantly, where the list fails to identify either the author or its recipient,
those persons’ relationships to the decisionmaking process cannot be identified and it becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to perceive how the disclosure of such documents would result in a
chilling effect upon the open and frank exchange of opinions . . . .”).
301. Similarly, courts have also justified assertion of the deliberative process privilege by the
government in APA decisions by glomming onto the seemingly overwhelming acceptance of the
privilege in the 1970s and 80s by the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, in cases
arising under the Freedom of Information Act. See Maine v. Norton, 208 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65–67
(D. Me. 2002) (sustaining the withholding of seventy-two documents from the administrative
record on the basis of FOIA’s Exemption 5); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,
No. Civ.A. 04-824, 2006 WL 197461, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2006) (“[I]t is clear that privileges
under the APA are considered to be ‘co-extensive with Exemption 5 of the Freedom of
Information Act.’” (citation omitted)). As an initial matter, the recognition of the deliberative
process privilege in FOIA cases composes a significant portion of the privilege’s dubious history
in this country. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But even more importantly,
Exemption 5 of FOIA, which allows an agency to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency[,]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006), has long been understood to do nothing
more than incorporate the common law privileges into FOIA. See Dianna G. Goldenson, FOIA
Exemption Five: Will It Protect Government Scientists from Unfair Intrusion?, 29 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 311, 319 (2002). Thus, reliance on FOIA cases does not change the underlying
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The Morgan Doctrine Justification

In the Morgan line of cases,302 the Supreme Court found that it was
improper to subject the Secretary of Agriculture—who had previously
conducted an adjudicatory proceeding closely resembling that of a trial court
judge—to deposition and subpoena.303 The court held that “it was not the
function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary. . . . [J]ust
as a judge cannot be subjected to such scrutiny [on appeal], . . . so the integrity
of the administrative process must be equally respected.”304 Accordingly, in
such circumstances the Court found that the agency should be accorded “the
same deference, respect and immunity . . . given to another court.”305 In plain
terms, the so-called Morgan doctrine “stands for the proposition that an
administrative decisionmaker who presides over a quasi-judicial hearing may
not be questioned unless it would also be proper to interrogate a judge in
similar circumstances.”306
It has been said that there is an “interconnectedness” between the Morgan
doctrine and the deliberative process privilege articulated in Kaiser
Aluminum,307 and that courts and parties should also not be able to personally
examine material provided to an agency head by his staff because it is akin to

failure of these courts to balance the public interest in sustaining the privilege in APA cases.
Indeed, the balance of interests is significantly different in FOIA cases than in cases involving
judicial review of agency rulemakings. As one state court has recognized, exemptions in laws
intended to provide the general public access to government records must be considered in
context because “unless [subject to exemption], all public records may be examined by any
member of the public, often the press, but conceivably any person with no greater interest than
idle curiosity.” Marylander v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 442–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(discussing application of privileges to California’s Public Records Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code §
6254). Presumably a party challenging the government in an APA case would have “a stronger
and different type of interest in disclosure,” id., which under Hickman v. Taylor must be carefully
balanced with the government’s need to sustain “candor” in the rulemaking process. See
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947). Once again, the courts have utterly failed to
undertake this required task.
302. There were four in total—Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468 (1936);
Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v. Morgan (Morgan III),
307 U.S. 183 (1939); and United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
303. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 421–22.
304. See Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 906 (citing Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422).
305. Id.
306. Judge Christopher Maska, Discovery and Administrative Decisionmakers: The Morgan
Doctrine Under Federal and Texas Law, 3 TEX. TECH. J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 61, 64 (2002). Some
courts have labeled the Morgan doctrine the “mental process privilege.” See, e.g., RLI Ins. Co.
Group v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
307. Robert O’Callahan, Administrative Law—Judicial Review—“Mental Process” Privilege
Prevents Discovery of Existence of Agency Head’s Statutorily-Required Personal Decision—
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Food & Drug Administration, 491 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir.
1974), 50 WASH. L. REV. 739, 745–46 (1975).
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examining his judgment and/or personal knowledge.308 Courts to date have
willingly accepted this claimed “interconnectedness” of the privileges as
grounds to sustain the assertion of the deliberative process privilege by the
government in seemingly all aspects of administrative decisionmaking,
including in rulemakings.309 The problem, however, as articulated by
Professor Wetlaufer, is that courts have disregarded the unambiguous language
in Morgan regarding the quasi-judicial nature of the Secretary of Agriculture’s
activities as though it was “not a part of the Court’s opinion.”310 When such
language is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that Morgan and its
progeny “represent a category of cases that are analytically and functionally
distinct from those that fall within the realm of the general deliberative
[process] privilege.”311
Indeed, many scholars readily agree that the Morgan doctrine extends no
further than those cases in which a “federal court sits in an [essentially]
appellate capacity and reviews” the formal adjudicatory decisions of an
agency.312 To take this a step further, the Morgan bar prohibiting inquiry into
the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is limited to those cases
in which the agency actually makes formal findings of facts, the basis of which
are being reviewed by the trial court.313 In such cases, the focus of the court
should be solely on the record before the administrative tribunal, as the sole
question for the court to decide is whether the tribunal’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence.314 As in the appellate-trial court context, “[i]f the
findings of the [agency] are supported by some reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence (albeit disputed evidence), the courts are not free to set
them aside even though the courts could have drawn different inferences.”315

308. Id. at 752.
309. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 156 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241–42 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Gutierrez,
No. 1:06-cv-00453, at *10–11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007).
310. Wetlaufer, supra note 10, at 906–07.
311. Id. at 906.
312. See id. at 910–11; Maska, supra note 306, at 62–64; Jensen, supra note 12, at 591–92.
313. Maska, supra note 306, at 65 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding as to this point in
Overton Park). Indeed, such a limited application of the Morgan doctrine was clearly evidenced
by the Supreme Court in Overton Park. While the Court generally affirmed the rule in Morgan
that “inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be
avoided,” the Court went on to explain that where, as in the case before it, “there are no such
formal findings[,] . . . it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review is by
examining the decisionmakers themselves.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
314. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see supra notes 225–32 and accompanying text; Part III.A.2.
315. T. Marzetti Co. v. Doyle, 523 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (citing 4 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.05, at 137–38 (1958)).
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Thus, what lies behind the Morgan doctrine, and for that matter behind the
substantial evidence test as well, is that an agency decisionmaker sitting in a
quasi-judicial role and making factual determinations should, like a trial judge,
have the freedom to weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses before
him.316
When looked at this way, a plausible argument can be made that the
Morgan doctrine does have a viable, but limited, role to play in reviewing the
informal rulemakings issued by administrative agencies. As previously
discussed, modern judicial review of rulemakings has come to use a hybrid
judicial review standard, incorporating both the substantial evidence test
(factual findings) and the arbitrary or capricious test (policy judgments).317 It
seems plainly obvious that the Morgan doctrine can preclude probing the mind
of the decisionmaker with regards to how he or she judged the evidence before
the agency in making formal factual findings. The problem, however, occurs
when Morgan-like protection is extended (under the guise of the deliberative
process privilege) to utterly eliminate judicial inquiry into “if—not how—the
decisionmakers had exercised their statutory authority. . . .”318 While there is
no argument that a court should not probe the inner workings of an
administrator’s mind with respect to how he reached factual conclusions,
nothing in Morgan or any other Supreme Court precedent, however, can be
said to sanction an agency’s attempts to withhold from the court information
bearing on what actually constituted the basis of its legislative-like policy
decisions.319 Use of any privilege in such a manner undoubtedly works to the
agency’s advantage, just as if Overton Park and its progeny would have been
overturned altogether.

316. See TBC Westlake, Inc. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision, 689 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ohio
1998).
317. See supra Part III.A.2.
318. O’Callahan, supra note 307, at 747–48 (“[A] close reading of both Morgan I and [United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954),] reveals the petitioners were entitled
to examine if—not how—the decisionmakers had exercised their statutory authority, and thus
indicates the Court’s willingness to allow inquiry into allegations of procedural irregularity.”).
319. See D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754, 760–61 n.12 (D.D.C. 1970)
(“[I]t was only by allowing the questioning of the Secretary himself that the Court could ascertain
whether the decisions were in fact made and what constituted the basis for the decisions[,]” and
while “[t]he Court is aware that the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan prohibited the
probing of the mental process of an adminstrative decision maker to determine his reasoning in
reaching a decision[,] . . . [t]he interrogation of Secretary Volpe here was limited to the actions
which he took, and the materials which he considered as the basis for his determination, rather
than his mental process in considering these materials.” (citation omitted)).
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The Privilege Undermines Judicial Review as Envisioned in Overton
Park

By the time Justice Marshall wrote his opinion in Overton Park on behalf
of the Supreme Court majority in 1971, another major change (or two) had
occurred within American administrative law that called for reconsideration of
the role of judicial review. Most prominently, there was a clear shift away
from formal adjudication toward the informal rulemaking model of agency
action that is dominant today.320 This switch in agency process to a less formal
procedure grew out of necessity, as Congress increasingly mandated that
agencies take action to address social ills brought to light by the new
environmental and consumer protection movements of the 1960s and 1970s.321
Obviously, with such an increase in mandated regulatory activity, conducting
more informal notice and comment rulemaking is, at least theoretically, more
efficient than holding trial-like hearings for each proposed regulation.322
At the same time, this increase in agency rulemaking activity was coupled
with a marked shift in the attitude of the judiciary toward the amount of
deference that should be given to an agency.323 Many of the new social
statutes adopted during this period increasingly called upon these bureaucratic
institutions to make important policy decisions,324 and there was a familiar

320. See Pedersen, supra note 220, at 38–39.
321. Wald, supra note 225, at 225. Judge Wald notes that “[b]etween 1966 and 1981,
‘Congress enacted 182 regulatory statutes and created 24 new regulatory agencies . . . compared
with 58 statutes and 8 new agencies between 1946 and 1965.’” Id. (footnote omitted).
322. See generally Pedersen, supra note 220, at 38 (“[A]gencies could not possibly discharge
their sweeping mandates to regulate pollution, energy, occupational health and safety, coal mine
safety, and consumer product safety (to give only a few examples) through case-by-case
adjudication in formal hearings.”). I say “theoretically” because in reality judicial, congressional,
and executive impositions “have impeded . . . the efficiency of the rulemaking process.” Tyler
R.T. Wolf, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position of Standards-Development
Organizations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 836 (2008). For a discussion of the
“countervailing trends” that developed after the surge of social rulemakings in the 1970s that
have generally made the development of new rules “more cumbersome, time consuming, and
difficult,” see Robert W. Hamilton, Prospects for the NonGovernmental Development of
Regulatory Standards, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 457–58 (1983).
323. Wald, supra note 225, at 224–25.
324. For example, as the Court of Appeals District of Columbia explained with regard to the
emerging environmental regulatory movement in the 1970s:
It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the danger posed by unregulated
modification of the world around us, and have created watchdog agencies whose task it is
to warn us, and protect us, when technological “advances” present dangers
unappreciated—or unrevealed— by their supporters. Such agencies, unequipped with
crystal balls and unable to read the future, are nonetheless charged with evaluating the
effects of unprecedented environmental modifications, often made on a massive scale.
Necessarily, they must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence,
with conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all.
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uneasiness that such decisions should be left wholly unchecked to the
administrators.325 Accordingly, it was no longer considered prudent to simply
rely upon an agency’s litigation affidavits, in lieu of some type of record, to
explain the basis of its rulemaking.326 As such, courts in the late 1960s and
early 1970s were really left searching for a new approach to judicial review.327
In his article Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of
Explanation for Legal Conclusions, Professor Gary Lawson provides us with a
list of four possible “options,” or standards of review, that a court sitting in
1970 could utilize when reviewing the substance (as opposed to process) of an
agency’s rulemaking.328 First, a court could simply conclude that where an
agency’s decision cannot be supported by justifiable facts (presumably under
the substantial evidence test), then the decision “is essentially a legislative act,
and the [organic] statute is therefore an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.”329 While one could argue that this solution may be a
correct constitutional result, such an argument ignores the history of the
American administrative state, which has clearly come to accept the fiction of
the constitutionality of this fourth branch of government.330 It also ignores that
under this fiction, agencies will be routinely required to “make important
policy decisions that cannot be reduced to traditional questions of fact or
law.”331
Second, Professor Lawson argues that a court could provide “only cursory
review” of the agency’s “legislative-like policy judgments,” upholding any
decision “that is not completely ridiculous on its face.”332 Arguably, given the
roots of the administrative state, the APA may in fact have envisioned that

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
325. Young, supra note 232, at 205 (stating that this period was “characterized by a general
reappraisal of the desirability of allowing an agency to be the sole champion of the public interest
in nonconsitutional cases”). Compare this with the concerns of the legal and business
communities post-New Deal (but pre-APA). See supra notes 165–85 and accompanying text.
326. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (rejecting
the lower court’s use of litigation affidavits as “merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations which have
traditionally been found as an inadequate basis for review” and “clearly do not constitute the
‘whole record’ compiled by the agency”) (citations omitted).
327. Professor Lawson, in his textbook on federal administrative law, provides a good
description of the struggle in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1970s over establishing
parameters of judicial review that would be better situated for reviewing agency policymaking,
which often lacks a sufficient factual record for the court to review. LAWSON, supra note 193, at
559–64.
328. Lawson, supra note 227, at 322.
329. Id.
330. See supra Part II.
331. Lawson, supra note 227, at 323.
332. Id.
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courts would give “an extraordinary level of deference to agencies.”333
Adoption of this “highly deferential”334 choice today, however, would be to
wholly reject the uneasiness that was present in the federal judiciary in the
Overton Park era,335 which since has become a staple of the “modern
conception of the judicial role in administrative review.”336
Third, a court “could simply determine the appropriate policy choices
[itself].”337 In other words, a court could undertake de novo review of the
decision, effectively allowing for a full-blown evidentiary trial as a basis to
scrutinize the agency decision.338 Obviously, such a review process would
consume tremendous judicial resources. More importantly, this approach also
does not correspond with our modern view of the administrative state in that
such significant judicial involvement in agency decisions would, at least in
some cases, tend to usurp all agency discretion so hard-fought for during the
New Deal.339
Finally, the fourth option, and the one adopted in Overton Park, is “‘hard
look’ review, under which the court ensures that the agency has taken a ‘hard
look’ at—has thought carefully about—the relevant problem.”340 Given the
possible choices outlined by Lawson (and assuming a court would not
plausibly accept the first option341), it can be fairly said that the hard look
doctrine adopted by the Court in 1971 is something of a compromise between
the substantial deference originally afforded agencies after adoption of the

333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Wald, supra note 225, at 225–26. Judge Wald identifies three reasons for the diminished
judicial deference to agencies in the 1970s. First is the previously mentioned increase in the
number and scope of regulatory activities during this time, coupled with the increasingly detailed
directives to the agency by Congress for which judicial review was authorized. See id. Second
was a “growing skepticism toward established bureaucracies based on the theory of ‘agency
capture.’” Id. at 226. This theory postulates that over time agencies tend to “pursue the interest
of the industries they regulate[] and not the general public interest.” Id. Finally, Judge Wald
points to the overall emergency of “judicial activism . . . in recognizing fundamental individual
rights . . . and in protecting members of disadvantaged and discriminated against groups . . . .” Id.
336. Lawson, supra note 227, at 323–24.
337. Id. at 324
338. But see Edward C. Fritz, Broadening Judicial Review Under the National Forest
Management Act, 3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 29 (1996) (“[De novo review] broadens both the scope
and standard of review. . . . [T]rue de novo review of an agency action allows a court to engage
in fact-finding beyond the administrative record (scope) and to independently evaluate the
wisdom of the an administrative agency’s decision without deference to that agency (standard).”
(citations omitted)).
339. See supra Part II; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 413 (1971) (pointing out the APA itself forbids de novo review in all but a few cases); Fritz,
supra note 338, at 31–34 (explaining that the Overton Park court overly forbade de novo review).
340. Lawson, supra note 227, at 324.
341. Id. at 322–23.
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APA in 1946 on informal decisionmaking and the adoption of a de novo
approach to judicial review. As Professor Lawson explains the test:
The agency must demonstrate awareness and candor. It must indicate that it
knows that it is dealing with factual and statutory uncertainty and that an
answer is therefore not dictated by any evidentiary or interpretive
considerations. It must then identify the nonfactual and nonstatutory
considerations upon which it chooses to rely and the reasons why it selected
those considerations rather than others. The agency should prevail, on this
model, so long as those considerations and the reasons that led to them bear
342
some plausible relation to the agency’s mission.

Of course, this intermediate approach to judicial review “is not so easy to
encapsulate in a single list of rubrics because it embraces a myriad of possible
faults and depends heavily upon the circumstances of the case.”343 However, it
can safely be said that under the hard look doctrine, courts will, at minimum,
demand that an agency “make plain its course of inquiry, its analysis and its
reasoning.”344 And here arises the tension between the deliberative process
privilege and the hard look doctrine: it is exactly the material that is likely to
342. Id. at 324–25 (emphasis added). Indeed, as the Supreme Court offered in its now famous
and often cited explanation of the so-called “hard look” inquiry formulated in Overton Park:
The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of an agency. Nevertheless, the agency
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ In
reviewing that explanation, we must ‘consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.” Normally an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
343. Lodge Tower Condo. Ass’n v. Lodge Props., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (D. Colo.
1995).
344. Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994); see also
Wald, supra note 225, at 234 (noting that in a surprising number of cases under the arbitrary and
capricious test, the “court is most frustrated about the agency’s failure to communicate any reason
for taking certain actions”). This requirement is no secret to the agencies of course. As one
federal agency (the National Marine Fisheries Service) states in its internal administrative record
guidelines:
The [administrative record] must . . . explain and rationally support the agency’s
decisions. . . . Particularly, the [record] should document consideration of opposing points
of view, and provide a thorough explanation as to why the preferred course of action was
adopted.
Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. C05-1128C, 2006 WL 1207901, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2006)
(citing NMFS Policy Directive 30-123, Administrative Records Guidelines (March 2005)).
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constitute an agency’s “reasoning”—i.e., its consideration of the various
factual and policy issues associated with a given rulemaking—that is also
likely to be defined by the government as “deliberative” for purposes of
redacting material from the rulemaking record.
For two separate, but very much interrelated reasons, this tension cannot be
resolved. First, use of the deliberative process privilege to remove material
bearing on the reasons behind an agency’s rulemaking decisions simply
conflicts with the requirement in Section 706 that a court review the “whole of
the record” before the agency. As courts have acknowledged in other contexts,
it would be unwise to “straightjacket” a reviewing court with the
administrative record offered by the government, in that the court could not
“adequately discharge its duty to engage in a ‘substantial inquiry’ if it is
required to take the agency’s word that it considered all relevant matters.”345
No doubt, if given the choice an agency would seek to proffer a record that
“may be ‘adequate’ because it fully articulates the agency’s reasoning,” while
simultaneously being “inadequate” in that it fails to provide contrary
“documents, memoranda, and other evidence which were considered directly
or indirectly by the agency.”346
Second, and by far the more grave concern, is that application of the
privilege will lessen—if not wholly abolish—the rigor of the hard look
doctrine. As evidenced, for example, in recent cases challenging government
rulemakings under the Endangered Species Act,347 by applying the deliberative
process privilege to redact information from the record associated with those
portions of the rulemaking decision to which the arbitrary or capricious
standard applies, it has become virtually impossible to check upon whether an
agency has—intentionally or not—overstepped the legal authority given to it
by Congress, or whether the agency has decided to act in a biased or wholly
unreasonable manner. Again, it is helpful to illuminate the difference between
an agency decision based upon verifiable facts and one involving more
subjective policy decisions. While a court may review the former under the
substantial evidence test without regard to “the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the
agency’s factual conclusions,”348 the “how and why” is the entirety of judicial

345. Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980) (justifying when extra-record
evidence should be allowed before a reviewing court).
346. Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26, 33 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Tenneco
Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 317 (D. Del. 1979) (“It strains the Court’s
imagination to assume that the administrative decision-makers reached their conclusions without
reference to a variety of internal memoranda, guidelines, directives, and manuals, and without
considering how arguments similar to [the Plaintiff’s] were evaluated in prior decisions by the
agency . . . [The Department] may not unilaterally determine what shall constitute the
administrative record and thereby limit the scope of this Court’s inquiry.”).
347. See supra notes 264–75 and accompanying text.
348. Lawson, supra note 227, at 317.
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review of a policy decision under the hard look doctrine. Unfortunately, it is
the subjective “how and why” that is exactly the target of redaction from the
record when the government asserts the deliberative process privilege.349
4.

The Privilege Undermines the Protections Against Administrative
Absolutism Envisioned in the APA

The modern role of judicial review represents a hard fought compromise to
a fundamental debate over the American administrative state: the desire to
utilize the courts to limit agency absolutism, arrogance, and/or non-compliance
with the law against the strong belief that under our Constitutional system,
courts should play a limited role, if any, in the making of public laws and
policy.350 Unfortunately, the deliberative process privilege, under the guise of
protecting bureaucratic candor, is effectively upsetting this compromise.
Assertion of the privilege has substantially reduced the ability of the public,
Congress, and the courts to place a legitimate check on administrative abuse of
the rulemaking process. As it did in the post-New Deal America, as well as in
the early 1970s, this lack of administrative oversight likely plays a role in the
diminishing trust of many Americans in their government.
In fact, recent history suggests a growing penchant for secrecy in the
Executive Branch, coupled with growing tendency of the President to exert
control over nearly all facets of executive agency interaction with the other
branches of government. It has been said repeatedly that the Administration of
George W. Bush was the most secretive administration in our history.351
Observers critical of the Bush White House can point to a litany of attempts to
keep policy matters of the administration behind closed doors:352 the

349. As Professor Lawson again so wonderfully illustrates, take the example of an agency
that, when tasked with a policy judgment, turns to an astrological chart as part of its deliberations
to make the final decision. Id. at 318–19. Undoubtedly under the hard look test (or for that
matter even a highly deferential test), use of an astrological chart in such a manner is irrational,
illegal, or both. Id. But with the deliberative process privilege in its arsenal, one must now
seriously wonder if the use of such an absurd means of lawmaking will ever be known to the
reviewing court.
350. Wald, supra note 225, at 229–330.
351. See JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE
W. BUSH, at ix (2004); Renee Loth, Editorial, Bush’s Passion for Secrecy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
21, 2004, at A15; Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Psst. President Bush Is Hard at Work Expanding
Government Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A24; Ted Widmer, Making War, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2004, at A7 (reviewing BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004)).
352. For a more thorough examination on the secrecy of the Bush administration, see
generally MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T. REFORM, SECRECY IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2004) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT], available at http://oversight.
house.gov/documents/20050317180908-35215.pdf; Gary D. Bass & Sean Moulton, The Bush
Administration’s Secrecy Policy: A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Values (OMB Watch
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President’s order restricting the public’s access to the papers of former
presidents;353 his order in the aftermath of September 11th expanding the range
of documents that may be kept secret from the public for up to twenty-five
years354 (and expanding the number of agencies that could classify documents
as secret355); the seminal fight between the White House and environmentalists
all the way to the Supreme Court to keep secret closed-door meetings between
the Vice President and industry representatives that comprised the so-called
Cheney Energy Task Force;356 the highly surreptitious handling of the firing of
nine U.S. Attorneys in late 2006;357 and the President’s general desire to
control all executive agency interaction with Congress.358

Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.OMBWatch.Org/RTK/Secrecy.pdf; Secrecy
Report Card 2006, supra note 107.
353. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001).
354. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (March 25, 2003).
355. See Loth, supra note 351 (“Bush has expanded the number of agencies with authority to
classify documents as secret, including Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture.”); see also WAXMAN REPORT, supra note
352, at 12–16, 25 (“While these agencies have presumably used this authority to classify some
information better kept out of the hands of our enemies, it has also been used to prevent access by
the public on information such as reports of known chemical releases, auto and tire safety
information, environmental and public health data, and even telephone service outages.”).
356. See Eric Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the Cloistering of the Cheney Energy
Task Force, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 330–33 (2008). Outside of the ESA cases discussed
earlier, probably the most celebrated deliberative process privilege case in recent years involved
the Supreme Court’s consideration of whether Vice President Dick Cheney must reveal the
details of deliberations that led to the President’s national energy plan in 2002. See Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 400 n.6 (2004). This was also the case in which Justice Scalia
refused to recuse himself after taking the (in)famous duck hunting trip with the Vice President
just months before the Court heard the case. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
Of course, this should not be confused with the Vice President’s other (in)famous duck hunting
trip in which he shot his long time friend, attorney Harry Whittington. Michael Kranish, Cheney
Accidentally Shoots Hunting Partner, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2006, at A1.
357. See Jonathan K. Geldert, Presidential Advisors and Their Most Unpresidential
Activities: Why Executive Privilege Cannot Shield White House Information in the U.S. Attorney
Firings Controversy, 49 B.C. L. REV. 823, 824 (2008). The matter appears to have begun with
the issuance of a highly confidential order in March 2006 delegating, to two of his top aides,
extraordinary authority over the hiring and firing of most non-civil-service employees of the
Justice Department. See Murray Waas, Secret Order by Gonzales Delegated Extraordinary
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Many of these attempts by the Bush administration to insulate itself from
congressional, judicial, and public scrutiny over its decisionmaking were
defended by presidential supporters on the grounds of constitutional separation
of powers.359 While such an argument may be plausible with respect to those
areas of executive authority enumerated in the Constitution, such as the
military and foreign affairs, it is difficult to imagine that such an argument
could be honestly made with regards to the decisions of administrators tasked
by Congress to make legislative-type social and economic policy choices.360
To accept that the Executive Branch can assert its political will over how these
decisions are made, and then conceal it through the deliberative process
privilege,361 would be to go one step beyond the fiction of a fourth branch and
toward total acceptance of the transfer of legislative power to the President.
Such political intrusion into the administrative process has been rejected twice
before: once by Congress in 1946 when it adopted the APA,362 and once in
1972 by the Supreme Court when it adopted the hard look doctrine in Overton
Park to address the changing nature of administrative decisionmaking.363
Thus, in order to once again restore the balance between the branches in the
administrative process, the courts, Congress, or both must take steps to address
the rampant assertion of the deliberative process privilege in APA cases and
mandate that the “whole” of the decision-making record be before the
reviewing court. Only then can we again realize the required check on the
executive and administrative power that assures accountability and openness.

Powers to Aides, NAT’L J., April 30, 2007, available at http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/
070430nj1.htm. The matter gained more attention when the White House announced that
thousands of e-mails dealing with the firings of the U.S. Attorneys and other official government
business may have been lost because they were improperly sent through private accounts intended
to be used for political activities. Tom Hamburger, Key Bush Aides’ E-mail May Be Lost, L.A.
TIMES, April 12, 2007, at A9. The matter was vigorously investigated by Congress through a
series of public hearings in which the White House flatly refused to cooperate, asserting
“executive privilege.” See Richard B. Schmitt, Bush Refuses to Cooperate in Probe of Attorney
Firings, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at A9.
358. Sofía E. Biller, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to Presidential
Signing Statements and Executive Hostility to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1067, 1125–26 (2008).
359. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 343–48 (2008). Separation of powers has also been explicitly
identified by some to legitimize the deliberative process privilege. See Maska, supra note 306, at
67.
360. Maska, supra note 306, at 67. Of course, such arguments have been made since at least
the time of the New Deal. See Donald R. Brand, The President as Chief Administrator: James
Landis and the Brownlow Report, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 69 (2008).
361. See Biller, supra note 358, at 1120–22.
362. Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
363. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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IV. AVAILABLE OPTIONS FOR COURTS TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY
DISCLOSURE OF TRULY SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN APA
CASES
It is not the purpose of this Article to argue that all governmental
information should be made available to the public without restriction.
Certainly it cannot be denied that there will always be a need to protect the
nature of some government activities.364 Even in the case of rulemakings
related to domestic policy, it is at least possible that information will be
considered by the agency that could undermine, for instance, national security
interests or unnecessarily infringe upon individual privacy.365 Nonetheless,
one cannot ignore the striking increase in recent years of the government’s
assertion of the deliberative process privilege in APA cases to withhold
information that most Americans would not consider associated with truly
secretive proceedings. To the contrary, every indication is that the federal
government is—more often than not—invoking the deliberative process
privilege to withhold information relevant to policies that impact the daily
domestic lives of Americans. Thus, we are left with the need for a judicial tool
that will effectively shield what is actually of a highly sensitive nature to the
government, while ensuring that a court has before it a sufficiently “whole
record” to enable review under the “hard look” doctrine.
Of course, we may have at least one tool that already can go a long way
toward fulfilling this need—the “state secrets” privilege. It has been argued
that the Constitution, which vested primacy in the field of foreign affairs to the
President, required the judiciary to take a cautionary role in examining whether
to order the Executive Branch to publicly release documents that bear on
national security.366 Given that the deliberative process privilege is, at least in
364. As even the American Civil Liberties Union, a staunch advocate of open government,
has acknowledged, not “every piece of information the government has can or should be made
open to the public.” Openness in Government and Freedom of Information: Examining the Open
Government Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 394 Before the S. Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology
and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) (Statement of Lisa
Graves, Senior Counsel for Legis. Strategy, ACLU) (emphasis added).
365. One need only point to the recent case challenging the failure of the U.S. Navy to
evaluate the environmental impact that the use of sonar may have on the world’s remaining whale
populations. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
365 (2008). While much of what constitutes the administrative record in this case likely involves
information of a technical and scientific nature, there is no doubt that some information—like
location of U.S. military assets—constitutes the type of information which is probably better left
secret and out of the hands of enemies.
366. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757–58 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Justice Harlan’s view, the court should not go beyond two inquires: (1) a review of the initial
Executive determination to a point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does
lie within the proper compass of the President’s foreign relations power; and (2) insisting that the
determination by the government that disclosure would irreparably impair the national security be
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part, the result of a mistaken use by the Court of Claims of the state secrets
privilege,367 a strong argument can be made to abolish the deliberative process
privilege altogether and instead, require the government to demonstrate the
national importance of information it seeks to remove from a rulemaking
record.
From a realistic standpoint, however, abolishing the deliberative process
privilege at this time, given its prevalent use by the lower courts, would likely
require an opinion directly from the Supreme Court, or, possibly, an act of
Congress to amend the APA. Thus, as an alternative, it is proposed that courts,
while continuing to acknowledge the privilege, also utilize other tools at their
disposal to balance the need to protect the disclosure of actual sensitive
information with their obligation to take a hard look at the basis of an agency’s
rulemaking. Two such tools, if used properly, are in camera review and the
ability to issue protective orders.
A.

In Camera Review

The term “in camera,” Latin for “in chambers,” refers to a legal proceeding
which is held before the judge in the privacy of chambers.368 Courts have
regularly required that a party asserting an evidentiary privilege, which is
appropriately objected to by opposing counsel, submit the disputed material to
the court for in camera review to help determine whether the material is
actually of a privileged nature.369 This approach has also been taken with
regards to disputes over the deliberative process privilege.370 However, in
camera review in these situations is generally limited to: (1) whether the
material at issue actually contains deliberative material and (2) “whether the

made by the head of the Executive Department concerned after personal consideration of the
document(s). Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953); Duncan v.
Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 638 (H.L.)).
367. See supra notes 100–110 and accompanying text.
368. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (8th ed. 2004).
369. See, e.g., Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 CIV 926 (CSH), 2001 WL 1819215,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001). As a general rule in federal court, the opposing party must
present to the court a factual basis adequate to support a reasonable, good faith belief that in
camera review may reveal evidence to establish that the material is actually not privileged, or that
an exception to the privilege applies. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989); see
also United States v. Corporation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1992). The threshold, however,
“is set sufficiently low to discourage abuse of privilege and to ensure that mere assertions of the
attorney-client privilege will not become sacrosanct.” Corporation, 974 F.2d at 1072.
370. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Conservation Law Found. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 864 F. Supp. 265, 273 (D.N.H. 1994); Safari
Club Int’l v. Babbitt, No. 91-2523, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18183, at *30 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1994);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. CIV 01-409 TUC ACM, 2002 WL 32136200, at *3–4
(D. Ariz. July 23, 2002); Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, Nos. Slip. Op. 00–41, 99-10-00628,
2000 WL 461006, at *1–2 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 17, 2000).
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government’s interest in confidentiality outweighs the litigant’s need for public
disclosure.”371
At first blush, one might assume that the mere allowance of in camera
review by the courts should significantly lessen the impact the privilege has on
judicial review under the APA. To some extent this is true. For instance, if the
material does not involve a statement by an agency official reflecting “advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations” on policy matters,372 then it
obviously is not protected, and upon in camera review the court should order
such material be added to the record. Of course, absent a blatant attempt to
hide factual or technical material from the court, what makes the privilege
problematic with regards to judicial review is that the sheer breadth of the
privilege likely covers significant portions of any rulemaking record.
This leaves most parties seeking disclosure of deliberative information in
APA cases to argue the qualified nature of the privilege,373 asking that the
court weigh the benefits and burdens of disclosure in a specific case. At this
point, however, it becomes next to impossible for the challenging party to
overcome the government’s assertion of the privilege. With respect to the
government’s need for the privilege, “most courts engage in only the most
perfunctory analysis . . . [parroting] the harms suggested by Justice Reed in
Kaiser [Aluminum] . . . [but] rarely [will they] examine whether these harms
really occur.”374 Similarly, while “the litigant’s need for the information[] can
be defined more objectively . . . few courts do so,” and even where the
information would be relevant or material to some legitimate objective, it is
usually insufficient to overcome the privilege.375 Thus, in the end, the burden
on the litigant, even when given the opportunity for in camera review, is
simply too difficult to carry.376
What is needed is for courts to change the nature of in camera review when
it comes to the assertion of deliberative process privilege in cases seeking
judicial review of agency rulemakings. Instead of inquiring into elements and
the qualified nature of the privilege, in camera review should be used to satisfy
the court, in accordance with Overton Park, that material has not been
excluded from the record that would show the agency’s decision to be arbitrary
or capricious, or outside of its statutory mandate. In other words, in camera

371. Elkem Metals, 2000 WL 461006, at *1; see also Weaver & Jones, supra note 300, at
312–20.
372. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001).
373. See supra note 48.
374. Weaver & Jones, supra note 300, at 315–16.
375. Id. at 318.
376. See Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[I]t will normally be far easier for the agency to establish its interest in
suppressing . . . documents than for the private litigants to establish their interest in exposing
them to judicial scrutiny.”).
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review should be used to protect the claimed “candor” of agency officials,
while at the same time assuring that the entire administrative record is before
the court.
B.

Protective Orders

While appropriate use of in camera review would go a long way to
restoring the damage inflicted upon the hard look doctrine by the deliberative
process privilege, it is a flawed approach in another sense: it lacks the
adversarial process necessary for a court to understand the various strengths
and defects in the government’s reliance on information in the record, or the
overall decision-making process.377 One solution to this problem would be for
the court to impose a protective order on the parties. Grounded in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26, courts are given broad discretion to issue orders on a case-by-case basis
to control the flow of information between parties.378 Through a protective
order, a court may limit who can be present for either side when examining
certain documents,379 or order all parties to protect confidential material from
broader disclosure.380
Unfortunately, the government often argues that the presence of opposing
attorneys—“even if the court enters a protective order prohibiting parties from
divulging the contents of the documents”—compromises the deliberative
process privilege, and as such, courts have been unwilling to permit adversary
representation during in camera review.381 This is a strange position for the
government to take, in that one of the primary purposes recognized for
issuance of a protective order is “to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, [or] oppression,”382 which are allegedly the very justifications
for the deliberative process privilege. Thus, one would assume that so long as
the candor of the agency is generally maintained (that is, outside of one or two
opposing counsels), a protective order is the ideal way to balance the privilege

377. Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“We recognize that a fuller
public record could enhance the adversary process.” (citation omitted)); cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing the failure of the adversary system with
respect to a court approval of settlements of representative actions); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131
F.R.D. 688, 689 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (discussing failure of adversary system in context of plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fee application).
378. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel.
Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 175 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
379. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5).
380. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7).
381. Weaver & Jones, supra note 300, at 314–15.
382. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). And of course, if the reason the government asserted the privilege
was to actually protect matters of national importance, the state secrets privilege remains to
protect that information. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
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with the assurance that the record is sufficient for purposes of judicial review
under Overton Park.
CONCLUSION
It has been said that “[a]nyone concerned with the state of our democracy
and the performance of our government must be concerned with . . .
rulemaking” in that “[w]e can be no less demanding about this process than we
are about any other, and certainly no less aware.”383 Indeed, given the size and
reach of the modern administrative state, there is little doubt that control of the
administrative process will greatly enhance the power of any one branch of
government far beyond anything envisioned by the Founders when they
ratified the American Constitution. For this reason, for well over a half of a
century now, the Executive Branch, the courts, and Congress have tussled over
placing proper checks on administrative authority. And amid this fight, the
deliberative process privilege has almost stealthily come to be one of the
Executive Branch’s most effective weapons to fight back against judicial
oversight. It has also played an important role in the White House’s attempts
to control, encapsulate, and then conceal the underlying political basis of many
recent administrative decisions. It is this use of the privilege, in particular, that
reeks of administrative absolutism, amounts to rule by fiat, and should raise the
greatest alarm among Congress, the judiciary, and the American public.

383. KERWIN, supra note 220, at 278.

